Takaichi set to remove Japan’s defense export bans

A Japanese official told me in confidence that Japan was going to relax its rules ondefense exports“soon.”That was in 1995. Therules have gradually relaxedover the last three decades, but they are still considerable.

At long last, new Prime MinisterSanae Takaichiand her coalition partner,Nippon Ishin no Kai, are poised to remove remaining restraints on defense exports, as announced in their recentjoint policy statement.

What’s the significance?

It’s as much mental as anything. And it goes beyond “exports,” as Japan scrapes away the accretion of self-imposed restrictions on this and the most normal of defense-related activities.

Taken with other language in the new joint policy statement, Japan may start to see itself as a “normal” country when it comes to its defense. This includes strengthening its capabilities while engaging freely withother nations’ militaries ー as it has started doing in recent years.

Acknowledgingwhat’s possible

Japan’s shift potentially reduces, if not ends, the over-reliance on the United States, which tended to stunt not only the country’s actual defense but Japanese thinking aboutnational defense.

Too often, when it came to defense, Japanese would start from the premise that somethingwas “not possible.” Or that it was “too hard.”That thinking needed to change.

The limitations on arms exports have, in fact, been breaking down for some years now. Consider that Japan was prepared to build and export submarines toAustraliain 2016. That’s a lethal weapon if there ever was one.

But once the export rules are removed, it won’t be necessary to engage in the verbal gymnastics and outright sophistry that often were used to justify particular exports in the past.

And Japanese industry’s view of the defense business might change.

Japanese industry has never viewed defense exports as an attractive and profitable business. Exporting was difficult, if not impossible, and why bother just building for the small domestic market?

In theory, removing export restrictions could alter business thinking. Companies that make defense hardware and equipment that might be in demand overseas may now prioritize this line of work. And their greater and steadier demand should bolster the overall business.

One wouldn’t expect Japan to become a major arms and equipment exporter overnight, and the defense export business is a sharp-elbowed game. But the door will at least be opened. And this tends to create markets and opportunities one may not yet see.

Building stronger ties with other countries

Also, Japan can start to more freely use defense exports to build defense (and political and economic) ties with other countries.

We’ve already seen this with thePhilippines– with Tokyo donating retired Japan Coast Guard cutters. And there’s talk of selling actual navalcombatants.

Japan recently signed an agreement to provide new destroyers to Australia ー some built in Japan and some in Australia.

There’s talk that New Zealand might be a potential customer, also. Then there is the possible sale of soon-to-be-retired Japan MSDF destroyers to Indonesia and Vietnam.

Part of the arsenal of democracy

Japan could also start to see itself as part of the “arsenal of democracy” – willing to produce weapons, ammunition, and hardware (for a price, of course) for other allies and friends that need restocking or that lack production capacity.

We’ve seen this already in a limited way. Japan transferred Japan-builtPatriot missilesto the Americans to replenish US supplies that had dwindled from supplying Ukraine.

Indeed, Japan might even supply Ukraine directly if things progress a certain way once the export rules are removed. Stranger things have happened.

Letting go of Komeito

Getting rid of the Liberal Democratic Party’s partnership with the Buddhist partyKomeito helped. Komeito was more than just anti-military.There’s a case to be made that Komeito was heavily influenced by Beijing.

The Komeito tie-up was a constant brake on efforts to improve Japan’sSelf-Defense Forcecapabilities and take a firm stance – and countermeasures – against adversaries’ pressure on Japan. Those would be China, North Korea, and Russia.

The LDP-Ishin no Kai tie-up potentially allows Japan to think about defense in a way that every other free nation on earth thinks about defense.Without Komeito. Japan’s allies and friends ought to welcome this.

It was tiresome when the Japanese would rattle off 10 reasons why they couldn’t do something that needed to be done.

Things often go slowly in Japan, but they do go – even if it’s at Japan speed.

Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine officer and former US diplomat. He is the author of the bookWhen China Attacks: A Warning To America.

This article was originally published by Japan Forward. It is republished with permission.