Time for a US Missile Mutual Assurance Pact for Asia

In the shadow of Russia’s grinding war in Ukraine, Europe is stirring from a long slumber on defense. On November 14, the United States approved a US$3.5 billion arms deal that will arm Germany with 173 Standard Missile-6 interceptors and 577 Standard Missile-2s, the largest such transaction in years.

These are not just weapons. They are the backbone for Berlin’s new F127 frigates, outfitted with Aegis systems to shield NATO’s flanks from ballistic threats and cruise missiles. It is a stark reminder of how quickly necessity can rewrite priorities. Just three years ago, Germany balked at sending even lethal aid to Kyiv.

Today, it is racing to rebuild an arsenal that atrophied after the Cold War, part of a broader European surge that will push collective defense spending to 381 billion euros this year alone, up from 343 billion euros in 2024. This is not panic buying. It is the continent finally reckoning with the costs of complacency.

The shift feels almost seismic, yet it echoes patterns we have seen before. Think back to the early 1980s, when NATO’s deployment of Pershing missiles forced a similar introspection across Europe. Then, as now, external pressure (first Soviet adventurism, today Russian revanchism) exposed the fragility of underinvestment.

The numbers tell the story. European military outlays, including Russia, jumped 17% last year to $693 billion, with projections for further climbs in 2025. NATO’s June summit in Vilnius even floated a long-term target of 5% of GDP on security spending by 2035, a figure that would dwarf the longstanding 2% pledge.

For the United States, this is welcome news. It eases the transatlantic burden, allowing Washington to redirect resources from Europe’s eastern edge. But in a world of finite budgets and infinite threats, relief in one theater demands vigilance in another.

As Europe arms itself, the Indo-Pacific stares down its own vulnerabilities, where allies like the Philippines lag far behind, exposing a dangerous asymmetry in America’s global commitments.

Consider Manila’s plight. On November 7, the Philippine Marine Corps unveiled its first battery of BrahMos supersonic anti-ship missiles, a $375 million acquisition from India designed to contest the Chinese navy in the South China Sea. It is a step forward, no doubt, extending coastal defenses to disputed waters where Beijing’s militia vessels prowl.

Yet this is one battery amid a yawning gap. The Philippines’ defense budget hovers at a mere 1.2% of GDP, with air and missile defenses still reliant on aging systems like the Israeli SPYDER, which only became fully operational this summer.

Plans to procure South Korean anti-ship missiles, announced in October, remain in early talks, hampered by funding shortfalls and procurement delays.

In exercises like Balikatan 2025, held last month, US and Philippine forces practiced cyber defenses and joint maneuvers, but the archipelago’s missile stockpiles are woefully thin – perhaps a few dozen rounds against potential salvos from China’s well-stocked Rocket Force.

This disparity is no accident. Europe’s awakening stems from a hot war on its doorstep, where drones and artillery have made complacency lethal. In the Indo-Pacific, the contest is colder, more maritime and insidious. China’s anti-access/area-denial networks, with thousands of missiles arrayed along its coast, aim to push US carriers beyond effective range in a Taiwan crisis.

US allies, from Tokyo to Canberra, have pledged more (Japan’s defense outlays hit 2% of GDP this year) but the Philippines, Vietnam and others strain under economic pressures and domestic politics. The result? A patchwork of capabilities that leaves the US Navy and Air Force shouldering disproportionate risks, much as it did in Europe pre-2022.

The parallel is instructive, but the solutions must differ. Europe’s missile renaissance, symbolized by Germany’s deal, offers a model not of emulation but of inspiration. Berlin’s purchase integrates American technology into a European fleet, enhancing NATO’s collective shield without reinventing the wheel. It is burden-sharing in action.

Germany pays full freight, bolstering interoperability from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Why not extend this logic to the Pacific, where transatlantic gains could fund Indo-Pacific equity? The US cannot (and should not) foot every bill. Instead, it could broker a “Missile Mutual Assurance Pact,” a targeted alliance framework for tech transfers and shared stockpiles among key partners.

Under such a pact, Washington would facilitate co-production of systems like the SM-6, allowing Manila to license-build variants tailored for littoral threats, much as Australia does under AUKUS.

Joint depots in Guam or Subic Bay would pool munitions, ensuring surge capacity without each nation overstocking. Funding could draw from redirected European peace dividends (perhaps 40 billion euros in fresh EU commitments by year’s end) to subsidize training and logistics.

This is not charity – it is investment. The Philippines, with its strategic archipelagic geography, becomes a forward node in denial strategies, obscuring Beijing’s calculus without direct US escalation. Recent analyses, including a Carnegie Endowment audit in October, underscore the urgency. Without fairer burden-sharing, US alliances risk becoming liabilities in a multipolar contest with China.

Critics might argue this dilutes focus, pulling resources from Europe’s front lines. But that misses the interconnected reality. A fortified Indo-Pacific frees European navies for hybrid threats closer to home, like Russian submarines in the Arctic. NATO’s own reports on Indo-Pacific partnerships, from last year’s regional perspectives, already nod to this synergy, warning that siloed spending invites exploitation.

A Missile Mutual Assurance Pact would position America as convener, not creditor. It echoes the successful NATO defense investment pledge, but with Pacific flair – emphasizing maritime resilience over continental masses.

To make it real, the US Congress should attach a rider to the FY26 National Defense Authorization Act, mandating a Missile Mutual Assurance working group under the Indo-Pacific Command.

It could be seeded with $500 million from existing foreign military financing, matched by allies. Manila’s BrahMos rollout shows the appetite. Germany’s frigate program proves the payoff. Together, they could redefine deterrence not as a zero-sum ledger, but as a web of mutual stakes.