Nothing for India to fear in Bangladesh-Turkey arms deals

On January 13, 2026, a large Turkish delegation, including officials from Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), arrived in Dhaka to hold consultations with Bangladesh Air Force officials.

Afterward, Bangladeshi officials reportedly confirmed the acquisition of six Turkish-manufactured T129 ATAK attack helicopters, as well as Hisar-O+ medium-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, under a US$600 million deal.

Negotiations have also reportedly taken place over the procurement of Turkish-made Anka unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). In late December 2025, it was reported that Bangladesh is considering purchasing Cirit laser-guided missiles, manufactured by the Turkish defense company Roketsan.

Indian print and online media outlets, meanwhile, have presented the expansion of Turkish–Bangladeshi defense cooperation in an alarmist manner. It is true that the Bangladesh Armed Forces currently operate numerous units of Turkish-built military equipment.

The Bangladesh Army operates a range of Turkish-made weapon systems, including several types of Kobra and Kobra II infantry mobility vehicles (IMVs), BMC-235-16 trucks, TRG-230 rockets, TRG-300 Kasirga multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), Boran air-transportable howitzers and Bayraktar TB2 UCAVs.

The Bangladesh Air Force, meanwhile, uses Turkish-manufactured Teber-81 laser-guided munitions. Moreover, in addition to the T129 ATAK attack helicopters, Anka UCAVs, Hisar-O+ SAM systems, and Cirit laser-guided missiles, the country is reportedly also contemplating the acquisition of Tulpar light tanks and SIPER long-range SAM systems.

These acquisitions could significantly boost the country’s defensive capabilities. Turkey has provided technological assistance to the Bangladesh Machine Tools Factory (BMTF) and floated the idea of constructing joint defense-industrial facilities in Chattogram and Narayanganj.

Indian reactions to Bangladesh’s procurement of Turkish military equipment have been telling, as many portray the deals as nefarious designs against India. The reality, however, is quite different, and to a certain extent, more mundane than armchair analysts would care to admit.

First, since its independence in 1971, Bangladesh’s strategic culture has been highly defensive. Equipped with modest military means and confronted by a complex array of socio-economic challenges, Bangladesh has shown little inclination toward risk-taking or adventurism in its foreign relations.

Aside from small-scale defensive border skirmishes and United Nations peace support operations, Bangladesh has refrained from external military operations, even in the face of serious provocations such as the massive influx of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar in 2017.

Every government in Dhaka, regardless of its party affiliation, has prioritized internal consolidation and socio-economic development. The interim government is no exception, and any incoming elected government is highly likely to pursue the same objectives. Bangladesh’s strategic posture is therefore fundamentally defensive.

Second, Bangladesh’s defense procurement is pragmatic and does not signal a full-fledged alliance with any supplier. China has been Bangladesh’s principal arms supplier since the late 1970s, a trend that continues today.

Although the previous Awami League-led government maintained comprehensive political and security ties with India, 72% of Bangladesh’s military equipment between 2019 and 2023 originated from China.

Bangladesh purchases defense equipment from countries such as China, Russia, and Turkey for practical and financial reasons, not political or ideological ones. These states supply weapons at lower cost, offer easier maintenance and attach few, if any, political conditions to purchases. If India were a major exporter rather than a major importer of military equipment, Bangladesh would likely seek Indian-made arms as well.

Third, Indian analysts are correct to note the growth of Turkish defense exports to Bangladesh, but their assessments of the implications are often exaggerated. Some Indian online media outlets, for example, have portrayed the potential acquisition of T129 ATAK attack helicopters as a threat to the security of the Siliguri Corridor, the land bridge between mainland India to its northeastern states.

The primary reason for the potential acquisition, however, is that the Bangladesh Air Force has not operated a dedicated attack helicopter since 1971, instead relying on Russian-made Mi-171Sh helicopters for assault operations.

By contrast, the Indian Army and Air Force operate at least 148 attack helicopters, including the advanced US-made AH-64E Apache and Russian-made Mi-35P gunships, and plans to acquire hundreds more. The acquisition of just six attack helicopters by Bangladesh therefore cannot realistically pose a threat to Indian security.

While some Indian outlets depict an emerging arms race between India and Bangladesh, Dhaka lacks both the intent and resources to pursue such a course. By acquiring a modest number of relatively sophisticated weapons systems from Turkey, Bangladesh aims to modernize and upgrade its military for internal security and external defense amid unrest in the Chattogram Hill Tracts and conflict along its southeastern border.

This poses no meaningful threat to India. Meanwhile, some Indian media outlets have openly called for the dismemberment of Bangladesh, and an Indian politician has even called for a genocide of Bangladeshis.

Finally, many Indian media outlets portray Turkish–Bangladeshi defense cooperation as a stepping stone to the formation of an anti-Indian bloc involving Turkey, Pakistan and Bangladesh. This is, however, inconsistent with Dhaka’s real policies.

Although tensions between India and Bangladesh have risen since the change of government on August 5, 2024, both sides have sought to compartmentalize specific disputes while maintaining trade, energy cooperation and even joint military exercises.

Bangladesh has also sought improved ties with Pakistan, but this does not amount to an alliance, as the two countries have distinct strategic priorities. Bangladesh has consistently adhered to its constitutional principles of nonuse of force in international relations and peaceful dispute resolution, and has traditionally avoided military alliances.

At present, a full-fledged alliance with Turkey and Pakistan would yield few substantial economic benefits for Bangladesh. Claims of an emerging anti-Indian bloc are therefore not grounded in reality.

Overall, Turkish-Bangladeshi defense cooperation reflects Bangladesh’s effort to diversify its arms suppliers and modernize its defensive capabilities. It is not directed against any third country, including India.

Media outlets should therefore act more responsibly and promote peaceful, cooperative and good-neighborly relations between Bangladesh and India.

Md. Himel Rahman is lecturer, Department of International Relations, Gopalganj Science and Technology University. His articles have been published on several platforms, including The Diplomat, The Interpreter, Asia Times, South Asian Voices, The Nation, The Daily Star, Dhaka Tribune and New Age.