Chinas AR-2000 helicopter drone hints at new naval playbook

This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that China’s military has tested a new shipborne uncrewed helicopter that analysts say could expand the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) operational reach in contested waters such as the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

Footage released by state broadcaster CCTV this week showed a lightweight autonomous helicopter parked on the flight deck of the PLAN’s Type 075 amphibious assault ship, marking the first confirmed sighting of such a drone operating from the vessel.

The aircraft is likely the AR-2000, a roughly two-ton uncrewed helicopter developed by the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) and first unveiled at an air show in 2024.

The Type 075, a 35,000-40,000-tonne amphibious assault ship capable of carrying more than 30 helicopters and launching six simultaneously, is designed to deploy troops, landing craft, and armored vehicles and has been active in operations in the vicinity of the South China Sea and Taiwan.

The drone’s small size and autonomous take-off and landing capabilities would allow ships to deploy more aircraft and operate in harsher weather conditions than crewed helicopters. It could conduct reconnaissance, strike and anti-submarine missions while extending the surveillance and combat range of naval forces, with testing on the Type 075 potentially paving the way for wider deployment across Chinese warships.

Exploring the potential roles of the AR-2000 in the South China Sea, it could enhance China’s maritime domain awareness in this semi-enclosed, disputed waterway. While China has established major runways, helipads, and sustainment facilities in the region, such as those on Woody Island, Fiery Cross, Mischief and Subi Reefs, other occupied features may be too small to support those structures.

A low-footprint drone, such as the AR-2000, could operate from those small features, reinforcing China’s ISR network in the South China Sea and monitoring the activities of other claimant states, including Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines.

China could also deploy the AR-2000 for island seizure missions in the South China Sea, providing ISR and close air support (CAS) for its maritime and special operations units. The relatively small size of contested features in the South China Sea may prevent large-scale amphibious operations, restricting efforts to small-unit actions.

In addition to monitoring the activities of rival claimant states and supporting island seizure operations, the AR-2000, in an anti-submarine role, can further secure the South China Sea as a bastion for China’s nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), aiding in the detection of US nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) that may be operating in the disputed body of water. Such operations could increase the survivability of China’s undersea nuclear deterrent, further assuring second-strike capability.

Despite China fortifying its occupied features in the South China Sea and conducting regular air and naval patrols in the region, US submarines continue to operate in what China may have designated as a safe zone for its SSBNs.

A March 2025 report by the South China Sea Probing Initiative (SCSPI), a Chinese think tank, highlights that in 2024, the US operated at least 11 nuclear attack submarines (SSNs), two nuclear guided missile submarines (SSGNs), and one SSBN on missions in the Western Pacific, including the South China Sea.

The AR-2000, operating from China’s more austere occupied features and warships in the South China Sea, can complement China’s efforts to build an “Underwater Great Wall” – an integrated concept of fixed and mobile sensors, unmanned systems, and data fusion designed to increase the probability of detecting and tracking submarines in strategically valuable areas such as the South China Sea.

Aside from providing ISR to monitor the activities of China’s rival claimant states in the South China Sea, support island seizure operations, and secure its SSBN bastion against US submarine incursions, China’s decision to operate the AR-2000 from its Type 075 amphibious assault ship may imply support roles for a larger amphibious invasion of Taiwan.

While the AR-2000 may be too small and vulnerable to transport heavily-armed troops for over-the-horizon ship-to-shore heliborne operations, it could sustain airborne troops sent in advance to capture and hold vital enemy infrastructure, allowing them to hold the area until reinforcements from the main landing force arrive – similar to what Russia attempted to accomplish in the February 2022 Battle of Hostomel Airport.

In the opening phases of an amphibious assault on Taiwan, China could opt to neutralize Taiwan’s air force and air defenses early on with air and missile strikes. Following that, manned-unmanned helicopter “hunter-killer” teams, with AR-2000s serving as “spotters” and more capable Z-10 attack helicopters as “shooters,” would eliminate any remaining resistance at key airfields such as Taoyuan, Songshan, and Taichung.

Using AR-2000s as spotters could allow Z-10s to engage targets while remaining outside enemy fire range. Following that, heliborne troops from amphibious assault ships could be flown in to capture and hold those facilities.

At the same time, China may attempt to land troops on beaches along Taiwan’s northern and northeastern coasts, including Yilan and Linkou. Until the main landing forces break through Taiwanese resistance and connect with their heliborne units inland, the latter remain dangerously isolated and too lightly armed for extended resistance, relying solely on aerial resupply and reinforcements as their lifeline.

In view of that, AR-2000s can operate from China’s Type 075 and other amphibious assault ships to resupply heliborne units deep in hostile territory. Relying on unmanned aircraft to deliver reinforcements might be too risky, given drones’ limited survivability in heavy electronic warfare environments and their current limitations in rapid decision-making during complex combat situations.

Relying on drones such as the AR-2000 for aerial resupply avoids sending manned helicopters on such missions, given the threat to aircrew posed by low-altitude air defenses, including man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and anti-aircraft guns.

If systems like the AR-2000 mature and proliferate, they may give Chinese planners new options for sustaining dispersed forces and extending operational reach without exposing high-value platforms or aircrews. This incremental shift could reshape how naval campaigns in the Western Pacific are planned.