Why Trump believes he can push Modi around

On September 17, 2025, US President Donald Trump telephoned Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to wish him a happy 75th birthday.

In a post on Truth Social, Trump described their conversation as “wonderful” and pledged to strengthen ties between the two countries—a gesture that initially raised hopes of easing tensions after the imposition of a 50% tariff on Indian goods on August 27.

Yet this apparent thaw in relations lasted just three days. On September 19, Trump signed an executive order imposing an annual $100,000 fee on H-1B visas, 70% of which are held by Indian nationals.

He also revoked America’s exemption for India’s involvement in Iran’s Chabahar port project and added India to its list of major drug transit or illicit drug-producing countries.

These actions, coming in rapid succession after the birthday call, have stunned Indian observers and policymakers alike. Rahul Gandhi, leader of the opposition in the Lok Sabha, India’s lower house of parliament, branded them a “diplomatic failure.”

Whether Trump’s moves constitute a personal assault on Modi or a calculated tactic to bend India to America’s will under the banner of “America First”—forcing concessions in the ongoing India-US trade talks—is open to debate. Either way, the episode lays bare the flaws in India’s overreliance on Washington, a miscalculation that has left New Delhi exposed and diminished.

Trump’s negotiating playbook is by now all too familiar: a blend of charm offensive and sudden coercion, akin to the “good cop, bad cop” routine long favored in police interrogations or high-stakes diplomatic negotiations.

It begins with flattery and ends with a jolt, keeping the other side off balance and eager to placate. During his first term, this pattern played out vividly in his interactions with India. There were the lavish spectacles—”Howdy Modi” in Texas in 2019, “Namaste Trump” in Gujrat, Modi’s home state, the following year—complete with Modi joining Trump at campaign rallies with the slogan of “Abki Baar, Trump Sarkar”(next term, Trump Administration) and effusive praise from both leaders.

Trump dangled the lure of shifting American manufacturing from China to India, even as he quietly revoked India’s preferential access to US markets under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and pressured New Delhi to curb oil imports from Iran.

In his second term, the script has repeated with uncanny precision. The 50% tariffs on Indian exports arrived in late August, punishing India for buying discounted Russian oil. Warm birthday greetings followed on September 17. Then came the trio of punitive measures on September 19: the H-1B fee hike, the Chabahar revocation and the drug-transit designation.

Even the US Congress has played its part in this orchestrated drama, dispatching a delegation to India recently to extol the virtues of the bilateral strategic partnership. It is a classic feint—the legislature offering honeyed words while the executive brandishes the stick.

Indians remain dangerously naive about this dynamic. To advance relations with America, the logic goes, India must concede everything and expect nothing in return.

The three post-birthday salvos appear calibrated to maximize leverage in the trade negotiations, where Trump seeks to curb India’s purchases of cheap Russian energy and pry open its markets to American firms.

Consider the H-1B $100,000 fee first. Indians hold about 73% of these visas, which are vital for the country’s information-technology sector. Firms such as Tata Consultancy Services, Infosys and Wipro now face billions in extra costs, curbing new hires and threatening the $125 billion in annual remittances that sustain economies in states like Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.

Beyond economics, the policy erodes Modi’s standing among the Indian diaspora in America, who Trump evidently hopes will blame the prime minister for jeopardizing their prospects.

The revocation of the Chabahar exemption delivers a sharper geopolitical blow. India has invested heavily in the port—signing a 10-year operating agreement with Iran in May 2024—to secure a corridor to Afghanistan and Central Asia, circumventing Pakistan and countering China’s sway via the nearby Gwadar port.

The US waiver, granted in 2018 under Trump’s first term, had shielded this project from sanctions. Its abrupt withdrawal, effective September 29, imperils $500 million in Indian commitments and risks broader isolation if Modi resists American demands.

Finally, the drug-transit listing—announced on September 15 but amplified amid the other moves—casts a shadow over India’s global image. By naming India alongside 22 other countries (including China, Pakistan and Afghanistan) as a conduit for fentanyl and precursor chemicals, the US has issued what feels like a calculated slur.

Though the State Department insists the designation reflects geography and economics rather than any lapse in enforcement, it nonetheless embarrasses New Delhi at a time when Modi seeks to project himself as a Viswa Guru and India as a responsible rising power.

These steps underscore Trump’s intent to squeeze India ahead of trade talks. He wants New Delhi to slash Russian oil imports—which have kept inflation in check amid global volatility—and lower barriers for the import of US goods and services.

Trump, ever the dealmaker, knows that Modi’s overtures to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China and Russia are tactical feints, not a hard pivot away from the West.

India remains hooked on Russian arms and energy, while pursuing de-dollarized trade via BRICS+ nations. By ratcheting up pressure, Trump aims to clip India’s freedom of maneuver. India’s predicament stems from a deeper malaise: an unhealthy fixation on America that has warped its foreign policy.

At the heart of this error is the worldview of External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar.

Jaishankar— who wrote an article titled “India and USA: New direction” in the limited-circulation volume“Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities”, published by the Indian Foreign Service Institute in Delhi in 2007—articulated a vision for closer US ties.

This approach found full expression after Jaishankar’s elevation in 2019. India inked four foundational defense pacts with the US, drawing it into Washington’s strategic embrace.

These were cornerstones of the Obama-era “Pivot to Asia”, which cast India as a bulwark against Beijing. Yet the bet was flawed from the start, premised on the illusion that America would lavish India with the same market access, technology transfers and investments it once bestowed on China as a favored partner.

Reality proved harsher. The US never reciprocated with equivalent privileges. Free-trade talks stalled; India withdrew from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2020 amid fears of Chinese dominance, but America offered no alternative.

Negotiations with the European Union languished. Worse, Trump’s first term signaled a lurch from free trade to protectionism—a shift India’s policymakers ignored, blind to the expressed views of his top economic appointees.

The upshot? No economic windfall for India, but a grievous loss of strategic autonomy. Alignment with America fueled the deadly Galwan Valley clash with China in 2020, where Beijing accused New Delhi of acting as a US proxy.

Rather than reassess, India doubled down, forging deeper military ties with Washington. Trump teased factory relocations to India, but icons like General Motors, Ford and Harley-Davidson pulled out around the same time, citing regulatory hurdles and market challenges.

Now, as Modi’s overtures to Moscow and Beijing grow warmer, Trump’s countermeasures seek to tether India more tightly. The September 19 actions serve as a stark reminder: friendship with America is useful, but not a panacea.

India must cultivate alternatives—deepening ties with Europe, ASEAN and Africa, while balancing relations with China and Russia. Retaliatory tariffs or sanctions might offer short-term catharsis, but they would harm India more than they hurt America.

What is needed is a long-term recalibration: a foreign policy that is multidimensional, balanced and fiercely independent.

The question lingers: what further penalties might Trump unleash? His next moves will hinge on how far India bends to US demands in trade, energy and defense. Tariffs could expand beyond steel and aluminium to pharmaceuticals, textiles and handicrafts—sectors that account for billions in exports and millions of jobs.

Under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), Washington might penalize India’s purchases of Russian kit, such as the S-400 air-defense system, crippling military readiness.

High-tech restrictions loom large, too. America could throttle access to semiconductors, artificial intelligence and critical components, derailing the “Make in India” and “Digital India” campaigns.

Geopolitically, Trump might revive the Kashmir dispute, internationalizing it at the United Nations and rallying allies against India. Resuming military aid to Pakistan could tilt South Asia’s balance of power further.

As a nuclear option, the US could weaponize the dollar’s dominance, threatening to sever Indian banks or firms from the global financial system—a drastic step, but one Trump’s bombast makes plausible.

The events of September 19 have ripped away the veil from India’s foreign-policy frailties. Unilateral dependence on Washington has boxed in New Delhi diplomatically, yielding scant economic or strategic gains.

The time has come for India to forge a bolder strategic path: one that prizes partnerships without subservience and sovereignty above all.

Bhim Bhurtel is on X at@BhimBhurtel