China ignites Scarborough Shoal flashpoint with bombers, ships

China has tightened its grip on Scarborough Shoal by deploying bombers and warships, a militarization of the contested feature that will test the resolve of the Philippines and its allies in the South China Sea.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theater Command confirmed the presence of an H-6 bomber armed with YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship missiles, capable of striking targets up to 500 kilometers away, alongside Type 054A frigates Chenzhou (552), Liuzhou (573) and Bayanner (551) and J-16 fighter jets.

The drills coincided with China’s National Day and were framed as a response to “unlawful infringements and provocations,” aimed at reinforcing China’s sovereignty claims under its Ten-Dash Line.

The deployment follows recent maritime confrontations, including aggressive maneuvers against Philippine patrol vessels and a collision between a PLA Navy (PLAN) destroyer and a China Coast Guard (CCG) cutter in August.

Scarborough Shoal lies approximately 222 kilometers west of Luzon and is within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The latest show of force underscores China’s growing reliance on high-end platforms—such as upgraded H-6 bombers capable of launching ballistic and hypersonic missiles—to deter US and Philippine operations across the First Island Chain.

This bomber overflight comes on the heels of China’s approval of a “nature reserve” at Scarborough Shoal, a move perceived to provide narrative and legal cover for its increased efforts to cement its control over the feature, under a veneer of environmental protection.

Such a move echoes China’s 1999 occupation of Mischief Reef, wherein China built structures it initially described as “fisherman’s shelters,” only to turn the disputed feature into a formidable artificial island base with runways, radars and missile emplacements.

Scarborough Shoal is pivotal to China’s Taiwan contingency planning—potentially the last piece in completing its sea-based nuclear deterrent. China may be implementing a bastion strategy for its nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), with the South China Sea becoming a secure area for continuous patrols.

Continuous SSBN patrols strengthen China’s second-strike capability. Still, its South China Sea bastion remains incomplete, with its occupied features stretching from the Paracels to the Spratlys Islands, leaving a huge northern gap in the semi-enclosed body of water.

Should China build over Scarborough Shoal, just as it did Mischief Reef and Fiery Cross Reef, it could fully triangulate the South China Sea from the Paracels and Spratly Islands, significantly expanding its SSBN bastion.

A militarized Scarborough Shoal would put the Philippines squarely in China’s crosshairs. Manila is just 350 kilometers from Scarborough Shoal, and Subic Naval Base is only 264 kilometers away – well within the striking range of aircraft, drones and missiles launched from the occupied feature.

In a Taiwan contingency, China could highlight this vulnerability in an effort to dissuade the Philippines from supporting a US intervention. This threat would add to its toolkit of economic coercion, elite co-optation and information warfare to force the Philippines to stand down. China could also use Scarborough Shoal as a staging ground against US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites in the northern Philippines.

Still, China’s hold on Scarborough Shoal is tenuous. Although it seized the feature in 2012 and has maintained de facto control, the absence of permanent facilities leaves its position insecure.

For one, the Philippines has maintained a steady tempo of high-profile international naval exercises with the US and allies near Scarborough Shoal. While the PLAN outmatches the Philippine Navy, the constant presence of more capable partners may have kept China from going all-in on militarizing the disputed feature.

Furthermore, the Philippines has a small number of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles that could easily target any fixed structure on Scarborough Shoal from launch sites in northern Luzon – making building over the feature a risky proposition for China.

However, the Philippines’ two-pronged approach to countering China’s potential takeover of Scarborough Shoal – increasing the tempo of international exercises near the disputed feature and building up its long-range precision strike capabilities – is riddled with pitfalls.

To counter China’s narratives and attract international sympathy, the Philippines has been implementing an “assertive transparency” strategy that aims to expose China’s aggressive actions internationally in implementing its maritime claims through a “name and shame” principle.

The strategy of assertive transparency is based on the premise that international pressure would force China to change its behavior. While the strategy has been relatively successful in eliciting US and allied support, its effectiveness has been limited, as reputational costs have not seemingly deterred China from using more assertive means to cement its hold on Scarborough Shoal.

The effectiveness of the strategy relies on the Philippines having the moral and legal upper hand in international law against China. However, it is uncertain whether potential regional partners, such as Vietnam and Malaysia—who also have competing claims in the South China Sea and maintain relatively stable diplomatic and economic ties with China—would support the Philippines on principle.

To date, it seems that maintaining their own stable relationships with China has taken precedence. This limited regional solidarity underscores how the Philippines must look beyond the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and toward extra-regional partners.

While Japan and Australia have played key roles in strengthening the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and participated in US-led multinational naval exercises in the South China Sea, their approach seems to support the Philippines as a frontline buffer against China while avoiding getting involved in its territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

European states such as France, Germany and the UK have sent warships to the South China Sea, but with resources tied up in Ukraine and no forward bases in the Pacific, such gestures remain largely symbolic.

Like the US Typhon system, BrahMos deployments are constrained by the Philippines’ small-island geography and poor infrastructure, with few roads and facilities able to support such an extensive, multi-vehicle system. That vulnerability could make BrahMos, like Typhon, relatively easy to locate with space-based assets or drones and destroy with drone or missile strikes.

Ultimately, the Philippines still relies on its longstanding alliance with the US, and it is unlikely that it could push back China’s tightening grasp on Scarborough Shoal without US backing.

While the US Senate reaffirmed in September its continued support for the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) between the US and the Philippines, the prospect of US retrenchment under the Trump administration, focusing on the Western Hemisphere and homeland defense, could leave the Philippines to its own devices to prevent China from militarizing Scarborough Shoal.

The future of Scarborough Shoal will test whether the Philippines’ alliances are a shield against China—or a promise that fades when truly challenged.