Trump greeted with hypersonic missile threat at Seoul APEC

North Korea’s latest hypersonic missile test has thrust the Korean Peninsula into a new era of strategic competition, as both sides race to master next-generation strike capabilities.

This month, multiple media outlets reported that North Korea test-fired two hypersonic missiles in what state media described as part of efforts to strengthen its “strategic deterrence” against potential enemies.

The missiles, launched from Pyongyang’s Ryokpho District, reportedly flew about 350 kilometers northeast and struck a target in North Hamgyong Province, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

Overseen by senior officials including Pak Jong Chon and Jang Chang Ha, but not leader Kim Jong Un, the tests are believed to have involved the new Hwasong-11E short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) system equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles unveiled in a military parade this month. KCNA called the system “strategic,” implying potential nuclear capability.

The US Indo-Pacific Command condemned the launches as “unlawful and destabilizing,” though they posed no immediate threat to US or allied territories. South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) confirmed the launches and said intelligence agencies are analyzing the system’s specifications.

The test came just days before the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in South Korea, attended by US President Donald Trump and China’s Xi Jinping, suggesting a calibrated show of force.

Not to be outdone, South Korea is accelerating its push into hypersonic weapons, with Hyundai Rotem unveiling its first air-launched hypersonic waverider at the 2025 Seoul International Aerospace and Defense Exhibition (ADEX).

The vehicle, powered by a dual-mode ramjet, reaches speeds of up to Mach 6 and combines glide and powered sea-skimming flight for survivability against defenses. Hyundai Rotem said it aims to begin flight testing by the end of the decade under a program supported by the Korea Research Institute for Defense Technology Planning and Advancement (KRIT).

The company also won a US$34 million KRIT contract to develop methane rocket engines for a reusable launch vehicle, a Korean-built alternative to SpaceX’s Falcon 9. Partnering with Korean Air on booster development, Hyundai Rotem is transitioning from Russian kerosene-based technologies to indigenous methane propulsion.

The drive into hypersonics follows successful 2024 scramjet tests by Hanwha Aerospace and the Agency for Defense Development on the Hycore missile. These efforts aim to counter North Korea’s own hypersonic programs and give South Korea a rapid, precision-strike capability.

While North Korea is known for its penchant for bombastic military propaganda – with its hypersonic missile declarations being no exception – the potential threat that its arsenal brings could not be dismissed outright.

Hypersonic weapons are designed to evade current missile defenses with a combination of Mach 6 speed and maneuverability. When deployed with conventional warheads, these weapons add to North Korea’s coercion toolkit versus South Korea, Japan, and the US.

Conventionally-armed short-range hypersonic missiles could enable North Korea to threaten South Korea’s missile defense systems and exert pressure alongside its non-nuclear arms, such as its formidable artillery force, which has much of its firepower aimed at Seoul and South Korea’s major industrial and population centers near the border.

Should North Korea arm its hypersonic weapons with nuclear warheads, which it may most likely do, that move could be considered a further evolution of its nuclear arsenal. Hypersonic weapons offer North Korea a chance to defeat South Korea’s layered missile defenses, keeping the former’s nuclear threat viable.

Alongside that, North Korea is known to be developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability that could reach the US mainland to threaten the logic of the latter’s extended deterrence guarantees to South Korea.

However, it isn’t known whether it has truly mastered MIRV technology, with contradicting statements about its June 2024 test – North Korea claims the test was a success, while South Korean and Japanese authorities dismissed it as a failure.

Aside from testing hypersonic weapons and MIRV-capable ICBMs, North Korea is diversifying its delivery platforms, fielding road and rail-mobile transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and cruise missile corvettes to increase the survivability of its nuclear arsenal against a pre-emptive attack.

These efforts may also align with North Korea’s push to gain international recognition as a nuclear power – a status that the US and South Korea flatly reject. Whether that nuclear power status is de facto or internationally recognized by authoritative nuclear powers such as the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), it confers regime security, which is in line with the Kim dynasty’s efforts to ensure its continued survival at the helm of North Korea.

From South Korea’s perspective, hypersonic weapons offer another means to threaten North Korea’s regime survival, which may be the cornerstone of its deterrent strategy. Rather than relying on overt military threats, which seem not to have deterred North Korea from belligerent actions, targeting its nuclear arsenal and leadership might force it to rethink its aggressive courses of action.

Having hypersonic weapons would enable preemptive strikes against time-sensitive targets, such as TELs before they launch their missiles, or SSBNs and warships before they depart port.

Hypersonic missiles, in conjunction with other weapons such as F-35 stealth fighters, stealth drones, Taurus air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), and Hyunmoo family of ballistic missiles, could pre-empt a North Korean attack or even decapitate its leadership.

However, the effectiveness of hypersonic missiles has not been tested on hardened underground infrastructure hundreds of meters under rock – undeclared facilities such as Sinpung-dong, Hoejung-ni, Sangnam-ni and Yongnim Missile Operating Bases that could shelter North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and leadership.

Given that challenge, South Korea may have developed more specialized bunker-buster weapons, such as the Hyunmoo 5 heavy ballistic missile, armed with an 8-ton warhead designed to defeat command bunkers 100 meters deep underground.

South Korea’s doubling down on building decapitation capabilities may stem from the US Trump administration’s preference for engagement with North Korea over a hardline stance. That position may reflect a tacit acceptance of a nuclear-armed North Korea while denying it international recognition as a nuclear power, which is little consolation for South Korea.

However, taking out North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and leadership is an objective fraught with risks. For one, North Korea could be pushed into a use-it-or-lose-it scenario, mounting a conventional or nuclear attack against South Korea, Japan, and the US.

Decapitating the Kim regime also presents a slew of challenges. Even if the Kim dynasty were deposed, the question of who gets to control North Korea’s nuclear arsenal remains unanswered. A successor regime might turn out to be even more opposed to South Korea and the US, more belligerent than the Kim dynasty and more inclined to use nuclear weapons.

As both North and South Korea race to get their hypersonic weapons programs up to speed, the contest is fast becoming less about technology and more about who can shape threat perceptions and the future balance of power on the Korean Peninsula.