Undersea cable risks imperil East Asias AI future

The vulnerabilities of East Asia’s submarine telecommunications cable system have become impossible to ignore in the AI age. Yet the responses proposed or recently adopted by Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and the United States remain inadequate.

A more creative, collaborative and effective strategy is overdue to ensure that subsea cables can meet societal demand and withstand emerging threats. These four nations—deeply interconnected both technologically and economically—are especially well positioned to adopt, shape and scale such an approach.

Subsea cables carry nearly all transoceanic data. This infrastructure is vital to every country but particularly to those heavily invested in AI, including the aforementioned four. Over the coming years, public and private actors in these nations will spend billions—if not trillions—of dollars on AI infrastructure.

But these staggering AI investments won’t amount to much without resilient subsea cables. As one Meta official noted, a data center is just a “really expensive warehouse” without sufficient Internet traffic flowing through those cables.

The critical role of subsea infrastructure raises the stakes, turning any vulnerability into a potential existential risk. As these four nations race to build an AI future, their ambitions collide with three converging trends that demand urgent updates to maritime law and infrastructure maintenance policies.

Rising threats

Three trends have pushed Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and the United States to update their laws to address subsea cable system vulnerabilities.

The first is deferred maintenance, which has become a critical issue. TeleGeography estimates that 15 cable repair shops will need to be replaced by 2040 to maintain current repair timelines and five additional ships will be needed to handle the expected increase in cable breaks across Asia.

These vessels are expensive—typically costing around US$100 million each. Even if built immediately, experts anticipate a shortage of workers with the skills (and interest) to operate them.

There is also a growing need for new cables, particularly in the northwest and northeast Pacific. The four nations must be prepared to invest heavily in both cable-laying and future repairs. Laying a new cable costs roughly $30,000 to $50,000 per kilometer while repairs often run from $1 million to $3 million.

These staggering sums help explain why cable laying efforts are increasingly led by tech titans Meta, Microsoft, Google and Amazon – all of which have the resources for massive capital expenditures. Still, additional funding will be needed to upgrade and secure the subsea cable system for decades to come.

The second trend is the heightened risk of sabotage by bad actors. China and Russia have openly invested in undersea technologies designed to identify, locate and break cables. China has even showcased uncrewed undersea vehicles with advanced capabilities that could be used for disrupting cables.

Reports also indicate that China’s spending on sensor networks and infrastructure has produced unparalleled data gathering on sea and subsea activity. Such information would be invaluable in coordinating attacks on subsea cables.

As long as China maintains its advantage and expands its offensive capabilities, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and the United States will be in a disadvantaged position defending against them.

The third trend is the increasing importance of the subsea cable system as more of the region’s economic, political and cultural life becomes dependent on AI infrastructure.

Inadequate policy responses

The policy responses from Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and the United States fall short of addressing the cumulative pressures created by these trends. Many public and private stakeholders have long operated under a “lay it and forget it” mentality.

In the United States, for example, Congress has received numerous reports detailing nearly-identical policy recommendations since at least 2004. Yet congressional leaders recently conceded that they have repeatedly ignored this guidance.

Taiwan recently adopted higher penalties for damaging subsea cables and now mandates vessels to keep their identification systems active to support enforcement. These measures are necessary but do little to address the need for more repair ships, more cables and more research to strengthen and improve the subsea system.

Japan has taken steps to accelerate cable-laying though not at the scale required. The Japan Bank for International Cooperation has supported cable projects around the world, helping reduce the risk that countries, including Pacific nations, with only one or two connections could be suddenly cut off by natural hazards or sabotage.

Japan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) has also launched collaborative, forward-looking initiatives to enhance subsea resilience. For example, MIC signed a memorandum of cooperation with the European Commission to coordinate cable-laying strategies and improve information sharing. These are positive steps but they remain insufficient given the magnitude of needed investments.

South Korea is also still searching for an adequate policy framework to address its subsea cable vulnerabilities. Seven of its nine cables pass through a single narrow route, making the nation acutely vulnerable to storms or sabotage. Yet South Korea still lacks a systematic approach to assessing threats and protecting its vulnerable subsea cables.

Novel solution

The four nations should respond to the urgent need for greater investment by creating a Cable Resilience Fund capable of rapidly financing new cables, repair ships and basic research into subsea technology.

The mechanism would be fairly straightforward. Each nation already requires private cable operators to obtain permits or licenses to land their cables with associated fees intended to offset environmental review and other regulatory costs.

The Cable Resilience Fund would simply raise these fees and pool the proceeds across the four nations. Each operator would contribute annually to support routine maintenance, new construction and ongoing scientific research.

Governments could and should supplement the Fund with direct contributions. This expanded pool of resources—available for loans, grants or direct spending—would solve the collective-action problem that has hindered investment in cable repair ships and foundational research.

Companies may initially balk at the higher fees but they will ultimately recognize the value. A larger fleet of repair ships would shorten repair times, reducing the need for companies to pay competitors to reroute their traffic. Importantly, vessels funded through this mechanism would prioritize cables connected to the four participating nations.

Private stakeholders would also receive early access to any new technologies that improve cable resilience, such as stronger armoring cable materials and advanced sensors for detecting threats.

At a high level, the Fund would prevent maintenance backlogs from again leaving the subsea cable system exposed to emerging, next-generation threats. Money cannot solve every challenge but in this domain it would address many of the most pressing vulnerabilities.

If successful, the Cable Resilience Fund could eventually expand to include additional nations. As membership grows, the Fund could evolve into a platform for developing common standards and rules across the global subsea system.

Collective cable fund

The vulnerabilities in the submarine telecommunications cable system pose strategic and economic risks far greater than the current policy response acknowledges.

The rising demands of AI innovation, combined with deferred maintenance and growing adversarial capabilities, render the “lay it and forget it” mindset untenable for Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and the United States.

Piecemeal policy measures—such as increased penalties or modest expansions in cable-laying—will not close the vast funding gap or resolve the longstanding collective-action problem at the heart of this issue.

The proposed Cable Resilience Fund offers a direct, self-sustaining mechanism to bridge the chasm between rising threats and lagging investment. By institutionalizing a reasonable cost-recovery model through elevated permitting fees, the Fund can address the chronic shortage of repair vessels, support foundational research into hardened subsea technology and ensure priority repairs for participating nations.

Ultimately, the security of the subsea cable network is critical for the region’s democratic and economic vitality. Without a resilient cable system, even the most ambitious AI investments remain vulnerable to a single act of sabotage or a natural disaster.

Adopting the Cable Resilience Fund would signal a commitment to proactive, collaborative governance—ensuring that this foundational infrastructure not only meets modern demand but is secured for the decades of innovation ahead.

Kevin Frazier is the AI Innovation and Law Fellow at the University of Texas School of Law.