Constellation-class implosion jeopardizes US naval superiority

A shipbuilding fiasco has forced the US Navy to scrap most of its Constellation-class frigates and race toward a new naval shipbuilding playbook.

This month, USNI News reported that Secretary of the Navy John Phelan announced that the US Navy has canceled most of its Constellation-class frigate program in a strategic pivot toward faster shipbuilding.

The decision, made in agreement with shipbuilder Fincantieri Marinette Marine, halts construction of four planned vessels while allowing work to continue on the first two ships, USS Constellation (FFG-62) and USS Congress (FFG-63), at Marinette’s Wisconsin shipyards.

The move comes amid mounting delays and cost overruns tied to adapting the Italian FREMM frigate design to US survivability standards, which pushed delivery of the first ship from 2026 to 2029 at an estimated US$1.5 billion.

US Department of Defense (DoD) officials said the cancellation reflects a broader push to accelerate acquisition and fleet growth to counter emerging threats, with “speed to delivery” now the guiding principle.

The US Navy, which requires 73 small surface combatants, will seek Congressional approval to redirect unspent frigate funds—part of the $7.6 billion appropriated for six ships—toward more readily producible vessels, including Landing Ship Mediums (LSMs) and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) for affordable mass at sea.

While the decision trims the program to two hulls, officials emphasized the importance of sustaining Marinette’s 3,000-strong workforce and industrial base, with Fincantieri pledging continued partnership in future amphibious, icebreaking, and special mission shipbuilding.

Looking back at the design issues of the Constellation-class frigates, a May 2024 US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report mentions that the class suffers from significant design instability, as the US Navy began construction with an incomplete functional design and unfinished 3D model, violating leading shipbuilding practices.

The report points out that over 340 essential design documents remained unresolved more than a year into construction, causing cascading delays. It adds that the immature design led to unplanned weight growth exceeding 10%, forcing potential reductions in performance requirements.

The US GAO report further mentions that construction began on blocks lacking completed detail designs, creating risks of costly rework and out-of-sequence work. It states that US Navy design metrics emphasize quantity over quality, masking true design immaturity and inflating expectations of construction readiness.

In a subsequent March 2025 report, the GAO sounded the alarm on the Constellation-class project mismanagement, stating that the US Navy certified 88% completion despite later admitting only 70% was done, triggering stalled construction and prolonged renegotiation of technical requirements.

Other mismanagement issues mentioned in the report include premature multibillion-dollar contracting for follow-on ships, amplifying risks before the design stabilized.

The GAO pointed out that the US Navy’s metrics masked actual progress, while redesigns eroded commonality with the parent vessel and worsened growth problems.

It adds that the program also faced high-risk, undemonstrated propulsion and machinery-control systems, and leadership repeatedly failed to internalize lessons from past programs, such as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and Zumwalt-class destroyer, reflecting systemic acquisition weaknesses.

While the US Navy plans to replace the Constellation-class with USVs to perform the roles of a low-end general-purpose surface combatant, unmanned systems may not fully replicate the capabilities of a warship such as a frigate.

For instance, USVs lack the survivability of crewed warships – they have no crew to repair system damage from rough sea conditions or battle hits. USVs may also lack range and endurance, as their small size may cap onboard fuel supplies. In addition, they may not have the magazine depth of warships – their small size may limit their ammunition and missile stores.

Also, autonomy at sea is still in its infancy, possibly limiting USV functionality under intense electromagnetic warfare conditions. Should a USV be captured, there is a risk of adversaries obtaining cryptographic keys to decrypt sensitive communications and datalinks.

The cancellation of the Constellation-class could leave the US in a quandary on how to match China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the largest in terms of hull numbers at 370 ships and 140 major surface combatants as of 2024, backed by a shipbuilding capacity 230 times that of the US.

The US could go for quality over quantity, continuing to build improved Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and continuing construction of the DDG(X) as the backbone of its surface fleet.

However, the high cost per ship, $2.1 billion per hull for the Arleigh Burke Block III and $4.4 billion for DDG(X), along with the pursuit of advanced designs and continuous integration of new technologies and revisions present significant challenges, potentially restricting the number of these high-end ships the US can build.

There is also the risk of concentrating too much capability in a few, expensive and potentially vulnerable warships that the US could not afford to lose in a near-peer conflict. This approach goes against the logic of dispersion and capability distribution to increase survivability. Also, USVs cannot substitute for the physical presence and visibility of crewed warships in contested areas, especially the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.

The US could also take a page from its F-35 program. With 19 countries involved in F-35 production and over 1,200 jets built, its success could be a template for a similar naval shipbuilding program.

Similar to F-35 production, the US could integrate its naval shipbuilding capabilities with trusted allies to increase production through economies of scale and ensure interoperability, while keeping key technologies under US control.

While South Korea’s Make American Shipbuilding Great Again (MASGA) proposal aims to revive US naval shipbuilding with a $150 billion investment, promising to build new shipbuilding facilities in the US and train the US naval shipbuilding workforce in new construction, repair and maintenance skills, that package may not address deeper structural issues.

Those include the US’s ability to attract and maintain a skilled naval shipbuilding workforce, South Korea’s vulnerability to economic retaliation from China and the risk of ceding long-term US strategic autonomy (South Korean shipbuilding giants Hanwha Ocean and HD Hyundai are expected to have heavy ownership of MASGA shipyards) for a short-term surge in US warship production.

Overall, canceling the Constellation-class is less a course correction than a warning flare over the US Navy’s eroding naval shipbuilding foundations. The challenge now is crafting a new production model — reviving US naval shipbuilding by itself or with allies — that delivers warships at the speed today’s great-power competition demands.