A fear of betrayal shared by Japan and Europe

In Europe, we are afraid that Donald Trump’s America may be selling us out to Russia. In Japan, where I have just been, the fear is of Trump selling them out to China. For Europe and Japan the shared danger is of the superpowers, especially the United States and China, getting together and making deals that potentially harm us.

Many are skeptical about groups of nations such as our own G7 or the wider G20. But those skeptics need to be more afraid of a potential “G2” of America and China.

This may be one reason why Japan’s first female prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, greeted Italy’s first female prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, with a big hug when they met for the first time on November 22-23 at the G20 summit in South Africa. Japanese do not usually like to touch other people, let alone hug them, so the warmth of that embrace was a surprise.

No doubt Takaichi was acknowledging the value of female solidarity in a political world still dominated by men. But she also shares other interests with Meloni, which may have encouraged the hug.

One of their main shared interests is that each must strike a difficult balance between their political affinity with Trump and the wider national objectives that each needs to serve.

Takaichi and Meloni are both seen as political conservatives, both have reputations of being tough on immigration and both have succeeded in gaining compliments from Trump. What Takaichi is now learning, however, is that warm words from Trump count for very little when real, hard issues are at stake.

In her first weeks since becoming Japan’s prime minister on October 21, Takaichi has found herself in a very public argument with China over remarks she made in parliament about what Japan might do in the event of an attempted invasion of Taiwan.

In truth, her remarks should have surprised no one, especially Chinese military planners: she just stated the obvious when saying that an invasion of Taiwan, which is less than 150 kilometers from the nearest Japanese island, could pose a threat to Japan’s survival that justifies Japanese military intervention alongside America. Her remarks could be criticised as unnecessarily explicit, but nothing more than that.

In recent decades, China and Japan have frequently had bitter disputes. So it was not a surprise when China protested about Takaichi’s remarks. Nor was it a surprise when Chinese tour groups started canceling visits to Japan and a boycott was placed on imports of Japanese seafood.

A partial surprise was that the Chinese response was unusually harsh, implying that they had sensed an opportunity to try to intimidate the inexperienced Takaichi. But the real surprise was that Trump said nothing publicly in Takaichi’s support.

On its own, this may not signify anything important. Trump and his team do not follow normal diplomatic practices, including with regard to long-term allies like Japan. On Taiwan itself, his statements have been quite variable, seeming to offer support to Taiwan one day and hostility the next. (Reassuringly the new National Security Strategy published on December 5th recognized the strategic importance of Taiwan and the need to deter any attack.)

America’s behavior towards Russia this year does point to potential dangers. After the Alaska summit in August between Trump and Vladimir Putin, European countries thought they had persuaded Trump to support Ukraine more strongly and to resist Russian demands for a peace settlement in which Russia would be given more Ukrainian territory.

Now they find that America had been talking secretly with Russia ever since the Alaska summit and that the 28-point “peace plan” that Trump’s diplomats have presented to Ukraine included big concessions to Russia, which Putin’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, has claimed Trump had agreed with Putin in Alaska.

It is clear from further talks between American and Russian officials that Russia is in no mood to shift from its hard-line demands, and America has shown no sign of pressuring it to do so.

The lesson is that it always makes sense to doubt Trump’s word, and to prepare for the possibility that he may be negotiating secretly behind your back.

On November 24, Trump had a phone call with President Xi Jinping, after which he phoned Takaichi and told her she should be quieter in her remarks about Taiwan.

That may not be bad advice. There is little for Japan to gain in escalating its dispute with China. But it is sparking concern in Japan about what other thoughts Trump might have about his relationship with President Xi and what kind of agreement Trump might have in mind next year when he is due to hold summits with Xi in both Washington and Beijing.

The precedent of Trump’s Russia “peace plan” implies that long-time Asian allies, including Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, need to think hard about how they can put pressure on him to safeguard their interests.

The best option would be to find ways to safeguard those interests without direct American help. If Europe had acted sooner to rebuild its own militaries and to provide Ukraine with enough support to push Russian forces back, it would not now be facing the risk of being sold out by Trump.

If it had acted sooner this year to lend Ukraine funds using frozen Russian central bank assets as collateral, it might not now be facing opposition from Belgium, which is hosting most of those assets. In truth, the proposed €140 billion would make a fair peace deal much likelier, though perhaps not until next year once Russia had seen how much difference the loan had made to Ukraine’s strength and resilience.

The crunch meeting of the European Council to decide upon this loan takes place on December 18, and the prospects of approval currently look no better than 50-50.

The equivalent task for Japan, South Korea and Taiwan is to invest now in their own defenses and to show that they will not accept Taiwan’s democracy being handed over against its will to the dictators in China. This is easier said than done, but it is not impossible as – unlike in Ukraine – the dangers are not imminent so there is some time to prepare.

As with Ukraine, there are also political forces inside America that can be deployed to deter Trump from moving towards a “G2” type arrangement with Xi.

The one issue on which many leading members of the Democratic and Republican parties agree is that China is a threat to America’s security and to its future role in the world. America’s traditional, loyal but now estranged allies in Europe and Asia can and should work together to persuade members of Congress to speak out against Trump’s preference for direct, personal deals with Putin and Xi.

To build on their friendly hug in South Africa, Meloni and Takaichi should talk about how to work together to protect what they both say they value: an open, secure world in which not brute force but laws govern nations’ conduct.

This is the English original of an article originally published in Italian by La Stampa. It can also be found in English on Bill Emmott’s Global View. It is republished with permission.