China hiding missiles on merchant ships for a Taiwan war

China appears to be experimenting with missile-armed merchant ships, probing whether commercial hulls packed with concealed firepower can deliver surprise salvos and tilt the naval balance in a Taiwan or US-China clash.

This month, multiple media sources reported that China appears to be testing the rapid militarization of commercial cargo ships as part of a broader effort to expand naval firepower at lower cost and with greater ambiguity, according to satellite imagery.

Images circulating online show a Chinese container vessel at a Shanghai shipyard – the Zhongda 79 – a 97-meter container ship equipped with containerized vertical launch missile cells with a 60-round capacity, phased-array radars, close-in weapon systems (CIWS), and electronic countermeasures, suggesting a modular “arsenal ship” concept that could quickly convert civilian hulls into combat platforms.

The Zhongda 79 may be an experimental prototype designed to verify containerized weapon systems that can be rapidly installed and removed, in line with China’s military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy.

However, it doesn’t expand China’s missile ranges in the Western Pacific, as long-range strike is already primarily provided by the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), supported by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) combatants and the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) strategic bombers.

Still, its fundamental contribution may be improving how, when, and from where missiles can be delivered, in ways that can be tactically disproportionate to the number of cells added.

A containerized launcher can be hidden among ordinary freight and fired with little warning from a merchant ship, generating salvos from unexpected places. Also, adding multiple launching platforms at sea increases the chance of saturation, as defenders would have to keep track of multiple trajectories and launchers.

Weaponizing cargo ships also allows for distributed lethality and increased survivability – spreading strike capabilities over a wide range of platforms.

These ships also present a grey zone dilemma, as any civilian cargo ship could be a launcher. A defender must make difficult decisions whether to treat merchant traffic as suspect, a potentially escalatory move, or simply accept more risk.

However, a capacity of 60 missiles per container ship is relatively small. China’s Type 055 cruisers have 112 vertical launch systems (VLS), while the Type 052D destroyer has 64.

While one such ship may not make much difference, multiple hulls could add hundreds or even thousands of VLS. But, considering the element of surprise and the possibility of multi-axis attacks these ships afford, they are more plausibly suited for limited first-salvo or opening-phase operations, rather than sustained missile exchanges.

The effectiveness of China’s weaponized container ships may also be dependent on the quality of its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

Adding weaponized merchant ships could further amplify China’s already decisive numerical edge. As Sam Tangredi mentions in a January 2023 Proceedings article, quantity almost always proves decisive in naval combat when professional competence between opposing forces is equal.

Tangredi points out that in 28 wars involving significant naval combat, spanning the Greek-Persian Wars to the Cold War, 25 were won by superior fleet numbers, arguing that technological advantages were short-lived. Notably, he states that in terms of firepower, having twice as many shooters beats half as many shooters firing fast, as fleet attrition, not holding territory, is the goal of naval warfare.

Putting those principles into perspective, the US Department of Defense’s 2025 China Military Power Report (CMPR) mentions that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is the world’s largest naval force in terms of hull numbers, at 370 ships and submarines. That fleet strength is backed by a shipbuilding capacity 232 times that of the US, according to a leaked US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) slide.

In contrast, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) mentions in an April 2025 report that the US has 296 battle force ships as of September 2024, while noting that US ships generally carry more fuel and munitions given the US Navy’s global mission.

However, the US Navy may still have a firepower advantage over China, as Johannes Fischbach mentions in a December 2024 article for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Fischbach points out that while the US Navy has 8,400 VLS on its warships, China, at the time of his writing, has 4,300 – a little over half of US capacity.

Still, Pete Pedrozo points out in an August 2025 Lawfire article that China’s large merchant marine fleet – around 5,600 ships – plus tens of thousands of fishing ships, provides it with virtually unlimited launch platforms.

Although merchant ships may lack the deep survivability design features of warships, Thomas Shugart argues in an August 2021 War on the Rocks article that well-prepared civilian vessels may be harder to destroy than often assumed, noting that during the Iran-Iraq “Tanker Wars” of the 1980s, more than 400 merchant ships were hit but only about a quarter were destroyed.

However, Shugart cites analyst Ian Easton’s warning that a lack of standardization, specialization, and coordination could hinder China’s use of merchant shipping for military purposes, while noting that China has taken steps to address these shortcomings.

He adds that although China’s merchant fleet can significantly boost naval hull numbers, it relies on civilian infrastructure not designed for high-intensity naval combat.

The US Navy has also taken steps to bolster fleet numbers. In July 2025, the US Navy released a solicitation seeking industry input in support of the Modular Attack Surface Craft (MASC) program.

Similar to China’s MCF strategy, the project utilizes existing commercial designs and production capabilities to enable the US Navy to field an unmanned surface vehicle (USV) force rapidly. The MASC could be armed with Lockheed Martin’s Mark 70 Mod 1 Palletized Delivery System (PDS), enabling rapid deployment of long-range offensive strike capabilities on unconventional platforms.

In the wake of the Constellation-class frigate project failure, the US Navy has unveiled a new FF(X) design based on the US Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter (NSC) ships. The US intends to acquire 73 of these ships, which follow a modular payload design similar to the short-lived Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and could carry the Mark 70 Typhon VLS as its main armament.

Still, the US may have no easy way out of its naval shipbuilding woes. In a report this month for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Seamus Daniels and other writers argue that US naval shipbuilding is crippled by systemic, interlocking problems that prevent ships from being delivered at scale, on time, or at cost.

Seamus and others argue that despite bipartisan support and rising budgets, US ship construction timelines have lengthened, with nearly every major program suffering delays and chronic cost overruns driven by inconsistent demand, volatile requirements, immature designs, workforce shortages, aging infrastructure, and a brittle, single-source-heavy industrial base.

In this naval shipbuilding race, China’s ability to weaponize what it already owns may prove faster than the US’s ability to build what it does not.