China-Indonesia ties show progress, feel pressure in 2025

China and Indonesia did more than commemorate 75 years of diplomatic relations in 2025. They stress-tested what partnership means when economic ambition, geopolitical flux and domestic governance collide.

The year delivered tangible bilateral progress across diplomacy, defense, finance and development. It also exposed persistent — and in some cases widening — gaps in oversight, sustainability and strategic clarity.

The relationship did not unravel, but nor did it settle into equilibrium. Instead, it advanced unevenly, propelled by momentum but constrained by institutions struggling to keep pace.

Indonesia’s entry into BRICS set the tone. For Jakarta, membership was both validation and reality check. It elevated Indonesia’s Global South credentials and expanded access to development and climate finance, particularly through the New Development Bank, which could emerge as a key backer of Indonesia’s green energy ambitions.

At the same time, BRICS sharpened domestic debate over whether Indonesia could remain non-aligned while operating inside a bloc where China’s outsized influence and weight are unmistakable. Seeking Global South solidarity brought leverage — and at the same time new dependencies.

China responded with sustained diplomatic investment. Wang Lutong, Beijing’s new ambassador, took up his post amid rising expectations and mounting complexity. His tenure coincided with intensified political exchanges, from Indonesian parliamentary delegations to Beijing to Jakarta’s hosting of senior Chinese officials, including Wang Huning, Xi Jinping’s top political theorist and senior adviser, whose visit underscored Beijing’s long-term strategic intent and ideological confidence. Symbolism mattered, but substance proved more difficult.

That tension was evident in 2+2 diplomacy, where ceremony overshadowed outcomes, and in milestone meetings like Prabowo Subianto’s May 16 talks with Wang Lutong, which celebrated history even as unresolved frictions lingered beneath the surface. Indonesia’s embrace of multilateral forums—from the China–ASEAN–GCC summit to the Global Governance Initiative—reflected how Jakarta and Beijing grew closer through shared platforms.

Defense cooperation marked one of the year’s clearest advances. Indonesia moved ahead with diversification by proceeding with the Chinese J-10C fighter aircraft, a decision driven by cost, capability and bargaining leverage rather than ideology. The move came amid online pressure following Indonesia’s purchase of French jets and fed broader debates about Prabowo’s tilt toward China.

At the same time, Jakarta elevated security concerns in ASEAN–China talks, signaling that engagement would not come at the expense of sovereignty. Balancing between giants remained Indonesia’s central strategic discipline.

Economic ties continued to deepen and test governance. Chinese investment supported infrastructure, manufacturing and housing schemes linked to Prabowo’s domestic agenda, bringing speed and scale but also raising questions about transparency and standards.

Critics warned that Chinese involvement could complicate flagship social programs, including the president’s free meal initiative, if procurement and oversight mechanisms were inadequate.

Few sectors illustrated the promise and peril of cooperation more vividly than nickel. Chinese capital helped turn Indonesia into a linchpin of global battery supply chains, advancing downstream industrialization and export capacity.

But the costs were increasingly visible: environmental damage in Raja Ampat, alleged abuses at Chinese-invested nickel plants, and persistent weaknesses in labor oversight. A drone-related incident involving Chinese workers and Indonesian military officials late in the year crystallized public concern that regulation had not kept pace with investment.

Energy cooperation followed a similar trajectory. Indonesia and China expanded collaboration in geothermal, solar, and green finance, often framed within BRICS and Global South climate leadership narratives.

Yet China’s solar expansion in Indonesia continued to rely on coal, undermining emissions claims. Discussions of nuclear cooperation raised alarms about hidden long-term costs, while analysts argued that any battery alliance must be built on sustainability rather than speed. Progress in diversification exposed the urgency of reform.

Infrastructure, long a lightning rod, entered a more sober phase. The Whoosh high-speed rail remained controversial, but 2025 made clear that its woes were largely Indonesian—rooted in planning, coordination, and land issues—rather than a so-called Chinese debt trap. Preparations for expansion talks, following Jakarta’s infrastructure minister’s visit to Beijing, reflected a shift from blame toward institutional learning.

China’s influence also extended beyond concrete and capital. Educational exchanges quietly expanded, rewiring long-term ties between universities, research institutes, and policy communities.

Beijing invested heavily in influencer diplomacy, new media platforms and narrative shaping, capitalizing on the decline of US diplomatic engagement and erosion of US soft power in Indonesia. These efforts gained traction, particularly as Washington’s renewed tariffs fueled disinformation and online polarization across Indonesian social media.

Human rights remained a sensitive fault line. Indonesia deepened engagement with Xinjiang despite international concern and remained muted as Uighurs were unceremoniously deported from Thailand.

Official dialogues continued but were widely criticized as lacking substance. Meanwhile, Beijing’s Muslim diplomacy during Ramadan demonstrated cultural fluency even as critics questioned whether symbolism was substituting for accountability.

President Prabowo’s foreign policy reflected Indonesia’s broader posture: assertive, transactional and image-conscious. His absence from the G7, optics of a Russia–China pivot and high-profile appearance at a military parade in Beijing drew criticism that global showmanship sometimes eclipsed domestic challenges, including protests linked to economic pressures.

Yet his message to China’s Li Qiang during the latter’s visit to Jakarta was consistent: Indonesia welcomed partnership, but only on terms that preserved room to maneuver.

Trade dynamics reinforced this balancing act. US tariffs created openings for deeper China–Indonesia trade and manufacturing cooperation, but Jakarta emphasized it still “held the keys.”

Central Java emerged as a focal point of Chinese interest, while Indonesia pursued collaboration with Beijing to grow a $3 trillion halal market. Transit rules for Indonesians traveling to China were eased, though Jakarta was urged to push for more reciprocity.

By the end of 2025, one conclusion stood out: China–Indonesia relations have advanced materially, across diplomacy, defense, finance and development. But that progress has also illuminated weaknesses in labor protection, environmental governance, information resilience and strategic communication.

The question facing Jakarta and Beijing is no longer whether cooperation is beneficial. It is whether both sides can ensure that growth strengthens rather than strains institutions. Progress, after all, is only durable when matched by accountability.

As the relationship enters its next phase, the stakes are no longer abstract. They are embedded in Indonesia’s forests and factories, classrooms and coastlines — and in China’s ability to prove that partnership can deliver not just speed and scale, but sustainability and trust.

That will determine whether the next 75 years are defined by balance — or by regret.