A massive Arctic military buildup will center on Greenland

Donald Trump is clearly in a hurry to dominate the political narrative in his second term of office. He began 2026 with strikes in Syria against Islamic State groups, the kidnapping of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro, threats to intervene in Iran and the declaration that the US would take control of Greenland – by hook or by crook.

Of all these the plan to add Greenland to the US either by negotiation or by force is easily the most controversial as it could lead to the break-up of the NATO alliance.

Greenland, the world’s largest island and a part of the kingdom of Denmark, has an abundance of critical minerals offering wealth and business opportunities. But the US president is also making a big deal out of the need to secure Greenland for US national security. He has repeatedly spoken of danger from Russia and China, whose ships, he says, stalk the island’s waters.

Publicly, at least, Russia has no problems with Trump’s ambitions in Greenland. Vladimir Putin has declined to criticize the Trump administration’s acquisitive comments, saying that the US has long had plans to incorporate Greenland and that the island’s future has “nothing to do with us.”

Russia’s vision doesn’t rule out the possibility of economic cooperation with America in the Arctic. After Putin and Trump met in August 2025 in Alaska, Russia mooted the idea of a “Putin-Trump tunnel” across the Bering Sea, a vision to which Trump responded favorably.

The Chinese, meanwhile, are not happy about Trump’s designs on Greenland. They tend to see the Arctic as a global commons in which non-Arctic states have an equal stake. So they are unhappy at the notion of any sort of arrangement that involves US or Russian spheres of influence in the Arctic.

The US has been trying to acquire Greenland since 1867 when, fresh from buying Alaska from Russia, Secrtary of State William Seward unsuccessfully raised the idea of purchasing Greenland and Iceland from Denmark.

Harry Truman offered US$100 million for Greenland in 1946, but Denmark refused. Instead the two countries agreed to a treaty in 1951 giving the US considerable latitude to deploy thousands of US troops and install the weather stations and early warning systems that characterized Cold War politics.

But when the Soviet Union collapsed, heralding an end to the Cold War, Greenland was relegated in importance. The US presence in Greenland went from more than 10,000 personnel on 50 bases to a single settlement at Pituffik space base (formerly Thule air base) with about 150-200 people.

But several factors – the Ukraine war, increased assertiveness from Russia and China in the region and the steady melt caused by climate change – have reinvigorated US interest in the Arctic region. In the US president’s view, Greenland is a strategic vulnerability.

Russia’s threat

Greenland sits at the western perimeter of what is called the GIUK (Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom) gap, which is vital to NATO defense of Europe. From here, submarines from Russia’s Northern Fleet in Murmansk can traverse into the North Atlantic, threatening targets on America’s east coast. In a crisis, Russian naval forces would move into both the GIUK gap and Norwegian waters, deterring American vessels from pushing north and effectively isolating NATO allies in the region.

Many of Russia’s missile sites and nuclear air bases in the region are sited on the Kola peninsula, on the eastern edge of Scandinavia, which is also home to its Northern Fleet surface vessels and submarines. From the Kola peninsula, the shortest direct flight route from Russia to targets on the American east coast lies across Greenland.

Russia’s Arctic facilities have been significantly upgraded over the past decade, even as the bulk of its defense budget has been directed towards its war in Ukraine. Seasonal air bases have been coverted for all-year-round operations and extended to allow the use of even the heaviest of its nuclear bomber fleet at locations in the Far North such as Nagurskoye in Alexandra Land which is part of the Franz Josef Land and Temp on Kotelny Island in the New Siberian Islands.

At present, Russian combat aircraft and strategic bombers, such as the Mikoyan Mig-31, Sukhoi Su-35, and the Tupolev Tu-95, can operate from these bases and potentially neutralize Pituffik. The space base is at present the key US defence establishment in the region, able to detect enemy ballistic missiles as soon as they take off.

Joint Russian and Chinese air patrols now regularly operate in the region, raising concerns about the defence readiness of Alaska. Many of their weapons are what is called “stand-off”, which means they can operate out of the range of the defensive weapons arrayed against them.

If Russia (or, for that matter, China) did occupy parts of Greenland, it could mean foreign stand-off weapons sitting just 1,300 miles from the US. Whoever is in the White House, this would be considered as unthinkable for US security.

US response

In June 2025, US Northern Command took over responsibility for Greenland, integrating it into homeland defense. This, said Sean Parnell, chief spokesperson for the Pentagon, would be contributing to a “more robust defense of the Western Hemisphere and deepening relationships with Arctic allies and partners.”

Trump has derided the exiting European defense effort in Greenland, insisting that only the US can defend the US. His perspective can only have been emboldened by the success of the recent Operation Absolute Resolve, the raid that snatched Maduro from Caracas. US combined forces demonstrated effective suppression of enemy air defenses, knocking out both the Chinese JY-27A radar system and the Russian S-300 and Buk-M2 air defence systems.

Whether or not Trump gets his wish to actually acquire Greenland for the US, there seems little doubt that Greenland will once again play host to a strong American presence on the island and that the Arctic in general will become a showcase for the latest military technology the US has in its armories.

Caroline Kennedy-Pipe is a professor of war studies, Loughborough University.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.