Why China and Russia blinked as US moved on Venezuela

The dramatic US operation that resulted in the arrest and extradition of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife has sent shockwaves through the international system.

For more than a decade, Maduro’s Venezuela stood as a primary outpost of Sino-Russian influence in the Western Hemisphere, representing a strategic thorn in Washington’s side.

Yet, as the smoke clears in Caracas, the global community is left with a glaring question: Why did China and Russia, the revisionist powers that served as Maduro’s economic and diplomatic lifelines, remain so notably restrained?

While Beijing and Moscow issued predictably sharp condemnations at the United Nations, there was no visible military counter-move or significant attempt to derail the US operation.

This strategic blinking is not merely a sign of weakness; it is a profound lesson in the ruder realities of contemporary geopolitics. To understand this restraint, one must look through the lenses of structural realism and the complex calculus of alliance politics.

Tyranny of geography

In the world of structural realism, power is not defined by the size of an economy or the number of nuclear warheads alone. It is defined by power projection, the ability to deliver and sustain force in a specific theater.

Venezuela is situated in the United States’ “Near Abroad.” Washington enjoys a crushing natural advantage here, with high-tier logistics, intelligence networks, and immediate operational reach. For the US, Caracas is a few hours away from Florida; for Beijing and Moscow, it is an ocean away.

Three structural constraints limited the options available to Maduro’s external backers. First, unlike the US, China and Russia lack permanent military bases or a robust security architecture in the Western Hemisphere, meaning any intervention would have required a transoceanic naval deployment that could be monitored and potentially interdicted by the US Navy’s Fourth Fleet.

Second, both Beijing and Moscow understood that the escalation costs in Venezuela were prohibitively high. Challenging the US in its immediate sphere of influence risks a direct, high-intensity confrontation that neither power is prepared to fight over a Latin American partner.

Third, both powers face strategic constraints elsewhere. Russia is absorbed in a high-attrition war in Ukraine, while China is prioritizing resources for potential flashpoints in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, making the opening of an additional, distant theater strategically imprudent.

In the realm of alliance politics, states face a constant tension between two fears such as abandonment (losing an ally) and entrapment (being dragged into a war for an ally’s sake).

By allowing Maduro to be taken, China and Russia have arguably abandoned a partner, dealing a blow to their credibility as security guarantors. However, they judged that the risk of entrapment was far more dangerous. If they had intervened militarily, they would have been trapped in a conflict where the US held all the geographical and tactical cards.

Instead, they have opted for managed commitment. By using the rhetoric of international law, condemning the US for violating Venezuelan sovereignty, they are attempting to win a narrative war.

They want to portray Washington as a rogue hegemon breaking the rules-based order, thereby courting the sympathies of the Global South without firing a single shot.

This crisis highlights a critical shift in Sino-Russian strategy. Realizing their hard power has limits in the Western Hemisphere, they are pivoting to normative power. They are utilizing Maduro’s arrest to moralize the geopolitical divide, positioning themselves as the defenders of the UN Charter and state sovereignty against “US bullying.”

While this may help their image in Africa, Southeast Asia or the Middle East, the Maduro case has laid bare a cold truth: Multipolarity has its limits. In some regions, including Latin America, the balance of power remains starkly unipolar.

Long-term fallout

The long-term fallout of this restraint will be felt by other middle powers. States that previously relied on China or Russia to balance against US pressure may now accelerate hedging strategies.

Seeing that Beijing and Moscow could not—or would not—protect Maduro in a moment of existential crisis, despite Venezuela’s significant strategic importance to both, these states will likely diversify their diplomatic and security portfolios rather than putting all their eggs in the revisionist basket.

Hence, the Sino-Russian restraint in Venezuela was not accidental. It was a calculated recognition of theater reality. The crisis reminds us that while global influence can be projected through debt and diplomacy, true strategic dominance is still tethered to geography and military might.

For all the talk of a post-American world, the laws of distance and logistics are still the ultimate arbiters of power.

Md Obaidullah is a visiting scholar at Daffodil International University, Dhaka. He is also a graduate assistant at the Department of Political Science, University of Southern Mississippi. He has published extensively with Routledge, Springer Nature and SAGE.