Attack on Iran a defining moment for the global order

At certain moments in history, the true significance of events lies not in the events themselves but in the rules that emerge afterward.

The military attack by the United States and Israel on Iran, accompanied by the assassination of the country’s highest political authority, belongs to this category of turning points—moments capable of permanently shifting the boundary between “exception” and “norm” in the use of force.

The central question today is not merely the outbreak of another war in the Middle East, but something far more fundamental: whether the international system is entering an era in which military power fully replaces legal and political constraints.

For decades, even during the most tense periods of the Cold War, unwritten red lines constrained great powers despite intense rivalry. The assassination of national leaders, direct attacks lacking international authorization and attempts to reshape strategic balances through the physical elimination of a state’s political leadership were considered actions capable of destabilizing the entire global security architecture.

What has now occurred in Iran suggests that these red lines are rapidly eroding. The real danger lies not simply in the military operation itself but in its normalization.

If an attack of such political and strategic magnitude becomes consolidated without serious international cost, the message to the world will be unmistakable: militarily powerful states may initiate preventive wars and eliminate political leadership based solely on their own security assessments, without global consensus or legal framework.

Once established, such a precedent will quickly transcend a single case and evolve into a repeatable pattern of behavior.

At this juncture, attention inevitably turns toward China and Russia. Both powers have repeatedly advocated for a multipolar international order and an end to unilateralism. Yet multipolarity is not achieved merely through the redistribution of power; it requires active defense of the rules that prevent strategic competition from descending into permanent disorder.

If the principles of sovereignty and the prohibition against unilateral use of force collapse, the first long-term casualties will be precisely those powers seeking to limit Western dominance.

For China, the implications of this transformation run deeper than they may initially appear. Beijing has long grounded its foreign policy in the principles of non-interference and respect for sovereignty — principles that helped create the stability necessary for its economic rise.

But if preventive attacks against sovereign states become normalized, those principles will lose practical meaning. In a world where the legitimacy of force is defined by unilateral interpretations of threat, there is no guarantee that similar logic will not later be applied in East Asian crises. Silence today may create a legitimizing precedent for actions tomorrow.

Russia faces a similar dilemma. Moscow has consistently criticized US security policies for bypassing international mechanisms, yet a restrained response to the current crisis in the Middle East risks reducing its opposition to mere rhetoric.

Deterrence in international politics is not produced solely by military capability; it depends equally on perceptions of political will to defend red lines. If it becomes widely believed that non-Western great powers will refrain from meaningful political engagement at decisive moments, the global deterrence structure will shift asymmetrically toward unilateral action.

Some may argue that China and Russia should avoid entanglement in a crisis not directly tied to their immediate interests. This view may appear realist on the surface, but it overlooks a critical reality: international rules change when altering them carries no cost.

If the attack on Iran becomes accepted as legitimate practice, the resulting norm may be applied in any region tomorrow. History demonstrates that once international norms are broken, they rarely return to their previous form.

Preventing the consolidation of this trend does not require military confrontation. China and Russia possess a wide range of instruments capable of raising the political and strategic costs of continued escalation.

Those include joint diplomatic initiatives, multilateral security frameworks, targeted economic pressure and, most importantly, the construction of global consensus against the normalization of unilateral force.

Even diplomatic proposals unlikely to achieve immediate adoption can challenge the political legitimacy of military action and reshape the international environment. What is at stake is not merely Middle Eastern stability but the very concept of collective security.

If states conclude that no effective mechanism exists to prevent preventive strikes, incentives for independent deterrence—including expansion of offensive military capabilities—will intensify. The likely result would be a world in which insecurity becomes permanent and regional crises more rapidly escalate into great-power confrontation.

The normalization of assassinations and unilateral attacks does not produce durable deterrence or stability; instead, it accelerates competition for preemption. In such an environment, even the strongest powers cannot rely on long-term security, as no actor can be certain it will not become the next target.

The present moment represents not merely a diplomatic test for China and Russia but an identity-defining one.

If they genuinely seek a multipolar world, they must demonstrate that multipolarity means more than distributing power — it also requires actively defending shared rules. International order remains sustainable only when major powers, despite disagreements, uphold minimum standards of acceptable conduct.

History shows that international orders rarely collapse suddenly; they erode through the gradual normalization of exceptions. Each time a red line is crossed without consequence, the next becomes easier to breach.

The attack on Iran may appear at first glance as a regional crisis, but in reality it marks a moment capable of redefining the legitimacy of war, sovereignty and deterrence for the next generation.

If China and Russia fail to play an active role in resisting this transformation, a world may emerge in which power replaces law and security becomes an increasingly fragile commodity. In such a world, no state — not even the most powerful — will remain insulated from instability.

Sarah Neumann holds a PhD in political science and is adjunct professor at Humboldt University of Berlin