When the US cedes Asia to China

(The following is an interview between Starmag’s Marco Mayer and Appia Institute’s Francesco Sisci, translated from Italian to English.)

It’s the aftermath of a phone call between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping that both sides described as positive, and before a bilateral meeting scheduled for October that is expected to yield some results for both.

In this uncertain period, it’s unclear how the conversation went or what the meeting will produce. Still, there are rumors that America might be considering a partial withdrawal from Asia, giving China more space to expand its political and strategic influence there.

Does the United States want to share the world with China, where Washington concentrates on the Americas and the Western Hemisphere, while Beijing focuses on Asia? If so, how will the countries in the region respond?

Mayer: Is it true that US President Donald Trump and the State Department are working toward a bilateral agreement with two major spheres of influence? The US will dominate the Americas and the Western Hemisphere; conversely, China will be hegemonic in Asia following the Americans’ departure from the scene.

Sisci: I’m not sure if they are actually doing that, but it seems like there might be a trend for the United States and China to agree on the US partially pulling out of Asia. I believe that would be crazy and very risky for everyone. Asian countries don’t want to be “sold out” by America to China, and moreover, a US withdrawal, even if partial, from Asia would increase regional and global tensions.

Mayer: From this perspective, how could relationships develop between Pakistan, China and Saudi Arabia on one side, and India, the Philippines and Japan on the other?

Sisci: It’s a very fragile and unpredictable situation, especially if America pulls back in Asia to favor China. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have just signed a defense agreement, which is presently aimed at containing the Houthi in Yemen. But, if mismanaged, it could push India and Iran to strengthen bilateral relations.

The Philippines has shifted in recent years toward either China or the United States. If Manila chooses Beijing, it could strengthen a pact between Vietnam, Indonesia, and Japan. I believe it’s unlikely that everyone will fully support Beijing. There could be a lot of resistance against China in region, no matter if this or that country is won over. Things can become very complicated in any case.

Mayer: How significant is Russia’s influence in Asia?

Sisci: The situation in Asia is very different from that of Europe. In Europe, countries were convinced they no longer had to worry about the Russian threat. Over the past 30 years, they have cut military spending from around 4% of GDP during the Cold War to 1%.

They believed Russia would never give up the significant revenue it earned from gas and oil. They were sure that politics and defense had completely given way to trade. We know this hasn’t been true, and we know European countries have woken up after the shock of Ukraine’s invasion.

Mayer: How is China viewed across Asia?

Sisci: In Asia, despite growing trade ties with China, no Asian country ever saw Beijing as no longer a threat, unlike in Europe with Russia. Many countries depended on the United States for their security, like in Europe, but unlike Europe, no country had de facto disarmed their military forces. They remained always ready for the possibility that circumstances could change.The risk for them was always about China.

Mayer: Then what did happen?

Sisci: In recent years, due to Chinese and Russian rearmament, rising tensions between China and the United States, and the invasion of Ukraine, all Asian countries have become worried and started rearming. It’s well known that South Korea and Japan have been considering the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons for at least a few years now.

Mayer: But will Trump try again to make a big deal with China, which Beijing ultimately rejected during his first presidential term?

Sisci: A major bilateral agreement between China and the United States could quicken the nuclear arms race between South Korea and Japan. Once these two countries acquire nuclear weapons—and they could do so very rapidly: not over years, but months—Vietnam, possibly Indonesia, and maybe Thailand might also pursue them. It’s easy to see Taiwan might also aim to develop nuclear weapons.

The overall tense situation, with India and Pakistan already armed with powerful nuclear arsenals, could lead to an apocalyptic scenario where the world might fall apart. In China, anyone who thinks they can gain from America’s withdrawal from Asia is making very naive calculations, in my opinion, and Chinese President Xi Jinping has not commented on this.

Mayer: Is the India-China rapprochement merely a response to Trump’s tariffs?

Sisci: I don’t think it’s just that. It seems there has been some US-India friction after the India-Pakistan clashes. This complicates resolving the situation with Beijing because it touches on Delhi’s relationship with Pakistan.

Mayer: Why, besides Cambodia, Burma (Myanmar) and Pakistan, does China struggle to establish good and solid relations with its neighbors?

Sisci: Many countries in the region fear Chinese arrogance and bullying not only because of historical reasons but also due to more recent experiences.

During the 2008 global financial crisis, the artificially low exchange rate of the renminbi hurt the economies of China’s neighboring countries. China’s trade surplus and its production capacity threaten to weaken the manufacturing of many Asian nations.

Of course, Trump’s broad tariffs are currently driving Asian countries toward China. However, if the US were to withdraw from the region, especially with India and Vietnam, new conflicts could develop between China and its neighbors. At that point, China, which is already facing tough economic times, would need to shift its attitude and industrial policies.

Beijing, in fact, could only benefit if it maintained good, very cordial relations with all its neighbors, but this is not the case. Even India, which has improved ties with China, is not hiding its concern about the Chinese threat.

Mayer: Over the last ten years, China and Russia have sharply boosted their military budgets. Why?

Sisci: The question is: what purpose do all these weapons China displayed in the September 3rd parade serve? The American arsenal is supposedly there to defend America and global stability. The Chinese arsenal is there to protect China from America and from potential threats from neighboring countries.

The picture of President Xi sitting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un (both allies in the invasion of Ukraine) is quite powerful. Perhaps it was meant to intimidate America, but it definitely puts all countries in the region on their toes. So, at this point, neighbors must arm themselves if they don’t want to be pushed around or bullied.

In theory, in a military confrontation, China should be able to easily prevail over Japan. It has a much larger arsenal, a bigger army, a population ten times greater and an unmatched military industry. In practice, however, the Japanese may feel differently.

Under perhaps similar conditions, Japan easily defeated China in 1894. And Japan may not be alone. For years, Tokyo has been working with India and numerous other Asian capitals in an intelligence and security system centered on the Quad, and this partnership goes beyond simple cooperation. There are intelligence agreements between Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia and India that form a potentially strong deterrent against China even without the United States.

With the presence of the United States, many Asian countries do not need to panic or rush to arms. It’s also difficult for them to break free from American control. But if the US lets go, the situation changes and becomes much more conflict-prone without their involvement.

Mayer: What is the difference with Europe?

Sisci: In Europe, NATO and the EU are multilateral organizations that restrict and influence each country’s freedom of movement with other members of the organizations and toward America.

There are no similar multilateral organizations in Asia; this makes each country’s diplomatic and military interactions, both bilateral and multilateral, more flexible. In other words, each country might have fewer constraints in pursuing its own defense policy.

Then, once Asia arms itself, it will naturally expand east and west, toward China, but also toward America, which is in Guam and Hawaii. The idea of a grand agreement with China, in my opinion, could work only if it’s not bilateral: it should be implemented within a larger framework; it should be multilateral, involving and communicating with all the Asian countries that are part of this strategic situation.

This definitely makes things more complicated. But even with all its complexity, this dialogue still remains easier than slipping into an arms race in Asia without the United States.

This interview is adapted from Starmag’s Italian version and republished in English on Appia Institute. It is republished here with permission from Appia Institute.