New Zealand: Lean into a role bridging superpowers, small islands                

New Zealand has long been viewed as the quiet achiever of the Pacific–a country that has long cultivated credibility in the Pacific through history, migration and cultural ties to the islands.

But now, as China’s strategic competition with the United States and US allies intensifies, Wellington faces sharper choices and is being squeezed from both ends more than ever. It now sits uncomfortably between two poles, balanced on a perilous tightrope, as it seeks to

• uphold its alignment with“like-minded” partners– Washington and Canberra;
• preserve economic access to its largest trading partner – Beijing; and
• maintain legitimacy among the Pacific Islands.

In this era of geopolitical flux, the challenge is not to choose sides as a follower in great-power rivalry, but to reassert New Zealand’s role as a neutral mediator rooted in Pacific agency — bridging divides without letting outside powers dictate Pacific futures.

To understand Wellington’s predicament, one must first see the larger pivot underway. China isn’t merely constructing a parallel global order. It aspires to displace the US primacy — not through blunt conquest, but by recasting norms, co-opting institutions, and promoting its notion of a“community with a shared future for mankind (人类命运共同体).”

But as Eric Engle warns, this ambition rests on a house of cards:

• China remains deeply dependent on international trade, energy imports and open sea lines;
• its assertive diplomacy alienates neighbors; and
• it tries to benefit from institutions it simultaneously undermines.

The central miscalculation is clear: that China can dismantle US influence without triggering economic blowback. Should the US pull back its strategic guarantees, or allies begin contesting Chinese influence more aggressively, Beijing’s model might begin to strain.

In that scenario, middle powers like New Zealand would not just be observers – they would be frontline actors in reshaping the regional order.

The Pacific reset: island agency as strategic force

For years Pacific states, courted by both Beijing (commitment through aid, infrastructure, and security pacts) and Washington (lofty summit diplomacy and defense pledges tore-engage, often withlimited follow-through), have complained about their voices being drowned out by strategic competition.

The 2025 Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) was a moment of clarity. It underscored how Pacific leaders are demanding both recognition of their sovereignty and prioritized commitments to climate resilience, development, and security – on their own terms.

By barring external partners from parts of the agenda, the Pacific states forced a reset as a striking assertion ofPacific agency: island nations would set their own priorities, rather than serve as proxies in the chessboard logic of great-power friction.

China’s enlarging footprint – through infrastructure financing, trade, and security agreements – has raised anxieties in Washington and Canberra. In response, the US has ramped up summitry with Pacific leaders and expanded aid commitments.

What the region needs is not another patron, but a partner willing to mediate – translating great-power ambitions into Pacific-relevant terms and ensuring sovereignty remains at the center of regional order.

New Zealand is well-positioned to champion those concerns while also serving as a voice of moderation within Western coalitions. It is a Western-aligned democracy and a member of the Five Eyes intelligence network – yet its foreign policy tradition places emphasis on independent diplomacy, from its nuclear-free stance in the 1980s to its support for Pacific-led solutions today.

This enables Wellington to act as amediator – a neutral bridge between great powers and Pacific states. Rather than forcing island nations into binary choices, New Zealand can help carve out a middle path that safeguards Pacific agency.

New Zealand will soon be tested on thorny questions likeTaiwan’s role in the Pacific Islands Forum and reforms to the forum’s partnership structures. Rather than lobbying on behalf of Washington or Beijing, Wellington should ensure that Pacific voices drive the process.

• Crucially, it must also resist reducing the region to an ideological battlefield of “democracy versus autocracy.” Resonating in Suva, Port Vila and Apia will not be mere slogans but tangible commitments:
• climate adaptation funding,
• abor mobility,education and
• infrastructure.

New Zealand is well-placed to lead in these areas — and to broker dialogue when outside powers overstep.

Wellington’s dilemma: credibility, coherence and autonomy

New Zealand’s credibility rests not on warships but on consistency. New Zealand’s dependence on China is often understated. Its deep economic ties with Beijing leave it exposed if China perceives Wellington as drifting too far into Washington’s orbit.

In the year ending December 2024, New Zealand exportedNZ$20.85 billion in goods and services to China— about20–21% of its total exports, nearly double what it exports to its next-largest markets, theUnited States and Australia combined. Meanwhile, imports from China in 2024 totaled aboutUS$10.19 billion, spanning electronics, machinery, furniture, plastics, and vehicles.

In other words, Chinese demand underpins a large slice of New Zealand’s economy. But the returns are uneven – exports fell from a2022 peak of NZ$20.1 billion to NZ$17.8 billion in 2024, narrowing the surplus and raising concerns about overreliance.

As trade ties deepen, so does the risk of economic coercion. Beijing has, in other theaters, used tariffs, informal barriers, or regulatory scrutiny as leverage. For New Zealand, that leverage is asymmetric: losing Chinese access would be materially worse than a Beijing cutoff of the US markets.

On the security front, New Zealand is embedded in theFive Eyes intelligence alliance(with the US, UK, Australia and Canada). In April 2024, New Zealand and the United States issued ajoint declaration reaffirming their strategic partnership. Intelligence sharing under Five Eyes has bolstered New Zealand’sresilience against foreign interference and espionage. Its recent moves – stepping up defense cooperationwith Australia and the US – risk casting it as another extension of a US-led containment strategy.

Yet Wellington retains a measured posture. New Zealand officials have occasionally expressed“unease” at expanding Five Eyes’ remitinto political messaging or public diplomacy, and outlets such as Al Jazeera have noted Wellington’s reluctance to let the alliance dictate its China policy. Historically, New Zealand has resisted automatic alignment – preferring toissue independent statements on Beijing – and analysts at RSIS observe that this “hedging” strategy helps Wellington preserve diplomatic flexibility.

New Zealand’s strategic opportunity: bridge, not proxy

Rather than forcing island states into binary choices, New Zealand should help open new pathways of cooperation, anchored on island priorities.Wellington’s enduring value in the Pacific lies in trust—not coercion.

Its ability to reclaim the mediator role speaks credibly to both Beijing and Washington and translates great-power ambitions into Pacific-relevant terms – ensuring that sovereignty and agency are not sidelined, if managed carefully.

A concerted push toward defense integration could undermine that trust; likewise, acquiescing to Chinese pressure would fracture relationships with traditional allies.

For Pacific nations, ideology is not the central concern. The pressing challenges are climate change, infrastructure resilience, labor mobility and sustainable development. In those domains, Wellington focuses on substance over symbol – delivering results rather than posturing. In regional forums (PIF, APEC, etc.), Wellington should push for reform in partnership structures so that island voices matter more than superpower agendas.

When contested questions arise – Taiwan’s status, or security protocols in the PIF – New Zealand’s role demands both courage and discipline. Its strategy should be to safeguard Pacific agenda-setting, rather than to advocate for either Washington’s or Beijing’s position.

Wellington should push back when Washington demands lockstep alignment – reminding allies that small states must retain strategic voice. At the same time, New Zealand must resist the notion that export dependence on China equates to political acquiescence.If New Zealand can walk this line, it will remain a trusted bridge between the Pacific and the wider world. If not, it risks irrelevance in the very region that has long anchored its identity.

A test ofcredibilityand autonomy

Pacific nations are watching closely. The 2025 PIF made clear that Pacific nations want partners, not pawns. If Wellington can embody that distinction – by working as a neutral mediator alongside external powers on shared security concerns, maintaining open diplomatic channels with China, and above all, prioritizing Pacific-defined agendas – it may continue to act as a trusted bridge to the wider world.

The choice is stark. Will New Zealand mediate with integrity — or be pulled into a rivalry that sidelines the Pacific itself by falling into reflexive alignment, or allowing economic pressure to marginalize Pacific diplomatic voice? As Honiara, Suva, and Port Moresby make clear, the Pacific refuses to be a chessboard. Wellington’s credibility depends on whether it listens, builds trust, and mediates, it carries significant weight.

The recent controversy over funding to the Cook Islands illustrates how this balance is fraught. When the Cook Islands signed a strategic agreement with China without adequate consultation with Wellington, New Zealand paused NZ$18.2 million in aid — a symbolic move signaling that Pacific partners are not passive recipients. This episode underscores both the power and limits of New Zealand’s influence in the Pacific region.

In an era of escalating competition, New Zealand doesn’t need to pick sides – it needs to reaffirm its role as a neutral, credible partner that keeps Pacific agency at the center. The real test for Wellington is whether it canbalance its Western commitments with Pacific priorities.

If so, itcould help shape a more inclusive regional order where small states are not sidelined by superpower rivalry. That means continuing to work with like-minded partners on issues of governance and security while also advancing climate finance, labor mobility and development in ways that respond to island needs.

By amplifying Pacific voices and resisting the securitization of every China-related issue, Wellington can prevent polarization from undermining regional cooperation.