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  • SMOKERS’ CORNER: PERCEPTIONS AND POPULARITY

    Apparently, the long winning streak of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in Sindh is not due to the party’s popularity in the province, but because there is no other force effective enough to challenge the party’s electoral hold here. But Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) “is still very popular.” 

    This is what most political analysts — especially from Punjab and those stationed in Sindh’s multi-ethnic capital Karachi — often posit. I’ll try to address both the perceptions. 

    First of all, I find their view (regarding Sindh) rather imbecilic. For every election since 2008, multiple alliances of strange bedfellows have formed in the province to become that ‘effective electoral force’, but none of them have been able to break the PPP’s spell in the province. Why? 

    The fact is, popularity alone is never enough to guarantee long winning streaks in elections. Functionality is more important. The PPP is now one of the most functional parties in Sindh, which attracts both the popular vote as well as the pragmatic vote. But, of course, then comes that rhetorical question about Karachi. Why is it so ‘mismanaged’ and ‘ignored’? 

    There is no doubt that Karachi faces some major issues. But to suggest that this is so because the PPP does not have a large enough vote-bank in the city is now an outdated view. Karachi’s issues aren’t recent. The roots of its many social, political and economic problems actually lie in the 1980s.

    The PPP’s hold over Sindh, despite what some may argue, isn’t because of weak opposition — it is the result of electoral functionality. So why is media analysis often based on perceptions without evidence?

    Due to waves of migrations from other provinces of the country (and from Afghanistan) in the 1980s, Karachi’s population began to balloon. This put the city’s resources under tremendous pressure, triggering vicious ethnic violence and corruption.

    From 1977 till 1988, Sindh was governed by Gen Ziaul Haq’s military dictatorship, and then by pro-Zia parties. The 1980s’ ethnic violence in Karachi and the rollback of the city’s economy crossed into the 1990s. For the next decade — from 1988 till 1999 — Sindh was governed twice by the PPP and twice by coalitions of anti-PPP outfits. 

    Karachi eventually fell into the hands of the Mohajir (later Muttahida) Qaumi Movement (MQM). MQM had enough votes and street power to stall any economic manoeuvres planned for the city, if these were seen by the party as not being in its interest. Also, by the 1990s, cities such as Lahore in Punjab began to compete with Karachi in terms of industrial output, largely due to the security challenges in Karachi.

    From 2002 till 2008, Sindh was in the hands of a military regime (Gen Pervez Musharraf) supported by a coalition of pro-Musharraf parties. Apparently, Karachi during this period was ‘getting back on its feet again.’ This was hogwash, really. On May 12, 2007, this farcical perception cracked and many tensions of the past that never went away came screaming to the surface again.

    Fifty-eight people died in a single day of violence between ethnic groups, armed gangs, political parties and the security forces. What’s more, the city began to also see the influx of militant Islamists from the northern parts of the country, looking to get their share of the pie in Karachi’s notorious ‘underworld’ universe, which also never went away. 

    It is true that, in 2008, when the PPP finally returned to power in Sindh, it was slow to address the city’s many issues, focusing more on the rest of the province. But it is also true that, after 2018, the party began giving the city more attention — especially after MQM broke into factions and the ‘popularity’ of PTI in the city started to erode because it had no clue how to do ‘constituency politics.’ Constituency politics is a vital function in Karachi’s many multi-ethnic constituencies. 

    Mammoth cities such as Karachi have mammoth problems. But it would be naive (and maybe even somewhat dishonest) to suggest that the PPP ‘is doing nothing for the city.’ In the last few years, it has been quite active in initiating various developmental projects here, especially after it won the city’s mayorship in 2023.

    Now, something about the PTI’s ‘popularity’ that one is constantly reminded of by analysts and vloggers. Those on PTI’s side doing this, is understandable. But more interesting is the way the so-called ‘neutral’ and even anti-PTI analysts and vloggers do it. 

    For example, often at the end of a critical tirade against the PTI, one can actually predict that the tirade will end with these words: “Behar haal, iss mein koi shak nahin, PTI aik bohat maqbool jamaat hai [Anyway, there is no doubt that PTI is a very popular party].” I always find this amusing. It is as if, during their tirade, the analysts/vloggers begin to feel guilty. Of what, though? 

    Indeed, the PTI did well during the February 2024 elections (under trying circumstances). It received 31.17 percent of the total vote. But this also means over 65 percent of the votes were cast for other parties. Nevertheless, things have moved in such a manner in the last one year that there is every likelihood that PTI’s vote-bank may have lost its shape a bit. 

    PTI was always more of a movement than a functional party. And, today, it is not even a functional movement. Also, there has been no recent survey to ‘scientifically’ gauge its ‘popularity’. February 2024 now looks far away in the past. 

    It is also possible that the perception of PTI’s ‘continuous popularity’ is the result of ‘feedback loops.’

    A 2013 study in the Journal of Social and Political Psychology and a 2023 study in the journal Party Politics describe this as an intense focus on a political figure or movement that can create a feedback loop where media coverage, academic analysis and political discourse all contribute to a heightened sense of the importance of the political figures and movements. This can lead to an over-simplistic and homogenised picture of a political trend. 

    Imran Khan and his PTI are in shambles today. But the thing that is keeping them afloat is a ‘popularity’ constructed by feedback loops, in which even those who oppose PTI have become stuck. In the current reality, the party’s electoral pull might actually be loosening.

    Anyway, so, should I too end this column with, ‘Behar haal, iss mein koi shak nahin, PTI aik bohat maqbool jamaat hai’?

    Published in Dawn, EOS, August 10th, 2025

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  • Tense phonecall on Pak-India ceasefire reason for deterioration in Trump-Modi relations: report

    A tense phone call on the ceasefire between Pakistan and India became the basis for the current breakdown in relations between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and United States President Donald Trump, Bloomberg reported on Friday.

    Trump on Wednesday imposed an additional 25 per cent tariff on Indian goods, citing New Delhi’s continued imports of Russian oil in a move that sharply escalated tensions between the two nations after trade talks reached a deadlock. The new import tax, set to come into place in three weeks, will raise duties on some Indian exports to as high as 50pc — among the highest levied on any US trading partner.

    While the rupture in US-India ties was abrupt, there have been strains in the relationship. Delhi has repeatedly rebutted Trump’s repeated statements that the US brokered a ceasefire between India and Pakistan after four days of fighting between the nuclear-armed neighbours in May. Trump also hosted Pakistan’s army chief at the White House in the weeks following the conflict.

    The two leaders spoke over the phone at the insistence of Trump on the sidelines of June’s G7 summit in Canada, which Modi attended as a guest. The call lasted 35 minutes.

    “PM Modi told President Trump clearly that during this period, there was no talk at any stage on subjects like India-US trade deal or US mediation between India and Pakistan,” Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri had said of the talk. “Talks for ceasing military action happened directly between India and Pakistan through existing military channels, and on the insistence of Pakistan. Prime Minister Modi emphasised that India has not accepted mediation in the past and will never do,” he said.

    Bloomberg reported today that “tensions came to a head” between the two leaders in the call with Trump’s repeated claiming of credit and India’s downplaying of the matter.

    “Modi felt like he needed to set the record straight in the call after his aides discovered that Trump planned to host a lunch the following day at the White House for Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir,” the report cited officials in New Delhi familiar with the matter, who requested anonymity to speak about confidential discussions.

    “While India had no problem if Trump met Pakistan’s civilian leaders, hosting Munir was seen as giving legitimacy to a military that Modi’s government accuses of supporting militant groups, they said. Wary that Trump would look to orchestrate a meeting between Munir and Modi, the Indian leader turned down an invitation to stop by the White House on the way back from Canada, they said, adding that he was also committed to visiting Croatia,” the report said.

    It added that since the phone call, “India saw a shift in tone from the White House after that phone call, according to the officials in New Delhi” despite the US not making a direct request for Modi to acknowledge Trump’s role.

    “Once Trump began publicly attacking India, they added, it was clear the episode marked a turning point in the broader relationship,” the report said.

    Modi said a day ago he would not compromise on the agriculture sector.

    For New Delhi, one of the main sticking points in trade negotiations has been Washington’s demand to access India’s vast agricultural and dairy market. India has remained steadfast about its labour-intensive agricultural sector, unwilling to risk angering farmers, a powerful voting bloc.

    “We will not compromise with the interests of our farmers, our dairy sector, our fishermen,” Modi said during a speech at a conference in New Delhi, his remarks widely seen as his first public response to the tariffs.

    “I know I will have to pay a personal price for this, but I am ready for it,” he added, without giving further details.

    In February, Trump said that he found a “special bond” with Modi when he visited Washington — complimenting Modi as being a “much tougher negotiator” than he was.

    Successive US administrations have seen India — the world’s most populous nation and fifth-largest economy — as a key partner, with like-minded interests in the face of powerful China.

    India and neighbouring China have long been intense rivals competing for strategic influence across South Asia.

    Now, India is bracing for a bumpy ride, as the US is its largest trading partner, with New Delhi shipping goods worth $87.4 billion in 2024.