Taliban’s TTP patronage threatens Pak-Afghan ceasefire as infiltration surges | The Express Tribune

The recent flare-up along the Pak-Afghan border has once again brought into question the Taliban regime’s willingness and capacity to curb cross-border terrorism. The October 2025 Doha understanding, brokered by Qatar and Turkey to de-escalate tensions, is seen as a last opportunity for Kabul to prove that it could act as a responsible state. Yet, early indicators suggest that the ceasefire will hold only if the Taliban end their covert patronage of militant groups operating from its soil, particularly the TTP and the BLA.

On the night of 11-12 October 2025, Afghan forces opened fire on Pakistani military posts along the Durand Line, prompting Pakistan to respond.

The Doha talks were necessitated by an alarming surge in terrorist infiltration from Afghanistan into Pakistan’s K-P and Balochistan provinces. According to field and intelligence reports, between June and September 2025 alone, Pakistan recorded a 36% rise in organised infiltration groups, or tashkeels, with nearly 4,000 militants crossing into its territory. Strikingly, up to 80% of these infiltrators were Afghan nationals – a steep rise from pre-2021 levels, when Afghan participation was limited to 5–10%.

The Taliban’s pledges to prevent the use of Afghan soil against other states – echoing the same assurances made in the 2020 US–Taliban Doha Agreement – remain largely rhetorical. Instead of curbing militancy, Afghanistan has evolved into an operational hub for TTP activities, complete with training centres, safe houses and financial pipelines. This institutional complicity stands in direct violation of international counterterrorism commitments and exposes the fragility of the current truce.

Data compiled by Pakistan’s security agencies and independent field sources depicts a disturbing pattern. Afghan nationals have been involved in multiple high-profile attacks across Pakistan in 2025, including the FC headquarters attack in Bannu, the Chaman suicide bombing and a series of assaults in North Waziristan and Quetta. More than 267 Afghan nationals have been identified by name and address among the militants killed in counterterrorism operations this year.

The extent of Taliban’s complicity is further evidenced by the regime’s protection of senior TTP leaders. TTP chief Noor Wali Mehsud reportedly resides in Kabul under official patronage, receiving a monthly stipend of $43,000. The Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence is accused of issuing travel permits to TTP operatives, enabling them to move across checkpoints with arms and ammunition. Over 60 militant camps operate freely Kunar, Nuristan, Nangarhar, Paktika and Khost provinces – areas that hosted international training networks during the 1990s insurgency.

The UN’s 36th Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report (July 2025) substantiates these claims, confirming that the Taliban continue to maintain a permissive environment for TTP and Al-Qaeda. The report details active training sites in Ghazni, Kandahar and Helmand where both groups are jointly trained, clear evidence of enduring ideological and operational linkages.

Despite mounting provocations, Pakistan has consistently preferred engagement over escalation. Since the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in 2021, Islamabad has undertaken over 25 formal diplomatic visits, including those led by the foreign minister, defence minister, interior minister and special envoys. Religious and tribal delegations, such as the 2022 visit by Mufti Taqi Usmani and a 17-member jirga, were dispatched to urge the Taliban and TTP to renounce violence.

In multilateral forums, Pakistan has championed Afghanistan’s humanitarian and economic causes. It advocated for the unfreezing of Afghanistan’s $9 billion assets, supported relief through the Economic Cooperation Organization, and facilitated the Early Harvest Programme to reduce tariffs on Afghan exports. These gestures, however, have been met with ingratitude.

Afghanistan’s repeated assertion of sovereignty rings hollow in light of its continued export of violence. Every time Pakistan conducts precision strikes against verified terrorist targets inside Afghanistan, Kabul accuses Islamabad of violating sovereignty. Yet, it offers no explanation for the open operation of TTP and BLA camps, or the presence of Afghan suicide bombers attacking Pakistani soldiers and civilians.

From January 2024 to October 2025, eight Afghan suicide bombers have carried out attacks in Pakistan, killing 63 people and injuring 135. The Taliban’s official silence, coupled with its refusal to hand over perpetrators or dismantle training centres, reflects a policy of deliberate denial. With sovereignty comes responsibility – one cannot claim statehood while simultaneously allowing one’s territory to serve as a launchpad for cross-border aggression.

The persistence of Afghan militancy has implications beyond Pakistan’s borders. The unchecked flow of weapons left behind by the US and NATO, estimated at over $7 billion, has armed groups like TTP and BLA with modern M4 carbines, night-vision devices and thermal optics. These arms are now circulating across South and Central Asia, heightening regional insecurity.

Moreover, the transformation of TTP from a Pakistan-focused insurgency into a regional proxy raises the spectre of renewed foreign interference. Intelligence assessments suggest that elements within Afghanistan are being exploited by external actors seeking to destabilise Pakistan and the wider region. Such dynamics threaten to unravel the fragile balance established after decades of war.

Pakistan’s patience, though remarkable, is not limitless. The Doha understanding provides a narrow window for Kabul to demonstrate compliance by verifiably dismantling TTP and BLA networks. Islamabad has made clear that if cross-border terrorism persists, it reserves the right to take “firm and proportionate” defensive action, including precision strikes on terrorist sanctuaries within Afghanistan.

At the same time, Pakistan continues to favour diplomatic solutions and regional engagement. It seeks to work with mediators such as Qatar and Turkey, as well as platforms like SCO and OIC, to ensure accountability. However, meaningful progress will only occur if the Taliban regime abandons its policy of denial and fulfils its commitments under the Doha agreement.

The Taliban regime can either act as a responsible neighbour, addressing Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns, or risk international isolation by continuing to harbour terrorist groups. The choice it makes will determine not only the fate of bilateral relations but also the future stability of South Asia.