Strategy demands uninterrupted diplomacy | The Express Tribune

Has Kabul quietly begun cooperating after weeks of halted movement at international border crossings? If so, could this quiet engagement evolve into a formal counterterrorism framework? It is too early to tell. What is clear, however, is the wave of belligerence that recently swept across the border, with ministers on both sides trading accusations and posturing aggressively.

Pakistan appears to have opted for hard measures, but only after fully exhausting diplomatic avenues. The country’s patience had worn thin over what it sees as the principal source of tension: TTP sanctuaries inside Afghanistan. Several rounds of talks —first in Doha and then in Istanbul since mid-October —consumed many days, yet ended without progress, prompting Islamabad to tighten the screws further.

The atmosphere has remained toxic ever since the defence and information ministers began issuing fluctuating and fiery statements. Both framed the crisis as India-sponsored proxy terrorism operating through Afghan territory. This narrative pushed soft diplomacy to the margins and opened the space for inflammatory rhetoric on both sides.

But this raises a critical question: if India is believed to be the puppeteer behind the threat, does the leadership in Islamabad realistically expect long-term results from punitive steps alone? Measures that directly affect the lives of farmers, traders, patients and daily-wage workers are eroding goodwill and deepening resentment. Even if Kabul eventually agrees to curtail the TTP, will Pakistan be able to rebuild trust with ordinary Afghans?

Peace, former officials familiar with border dynamics argue, will remain elusive without involving border communities who have carried the burden of conflict and bilateral tensions for decades. Border closures and suspension of trade and visa facilities are unlikely to curb cross-border terrorism. Nor will they produce permanent results given the proxy-driven nature of the problem.

So, why not step away from a narrow security-centric paradigm and instead adopt a geo-economic lens —the very approach that is shaping policy from Washington to Beijing to Delhi? Afghan authorities may be feeling the strain of border restrictions, but Pakistani exporters, traders, farmers, labourers and transporters are suffering comparable losses. Nearly two-thirds of Afghans reportedly live at or below the poverty line, and the latest standoff has further strained their access to essential goods from Pakistan.

Even when trade resumes, the hardship inflicted —greater poverty, deprivation, financial losses, and even deaths due to the inability to travel for medical treatment —will leave lasting scars. This is where hearts and minds are either won or lost. At the moment, Pakistan seems to be losing that psychological battle. And as long as the nexus between militant groups and their external backers remains intact, Pakistan is unlikely to neutralise the threat merely through border strangulation.

The Afghan Taliban regime may indeed be leveraging its warming ties with India in its dealings with Pakistan. Yet any sovereign state retains the right to cultivate relations it considers economically advantageous. Pakistan’s challenge is to press its security concerns with Kabul without disrupting broader regional economic connectivity —which extends far beyond just Afghanistan. Some Afghan ministers, officials and members of the intelligentsia may be sabre-rattling, but this is hardly surprising for a country battered by over four decades of war.

According to figures from the Afghan commerce ministry (as of November 19), roughly 12,000 containers were stranded across Karachi, Torkham, Kharlachi and Chaman. Hundreds were carrying perishable goods —fruits and vegetables —now spoilt, causing millions of dollars in losses to farmers and traders.

Securitising trade and visas inflicts disproportionate harm on border communities, who have little hope of compensation after weeks of disruption. Why were these communities not consulted before imposing such sweeping restrictions on cross-border movement and trade?

And is it wise for a nuclear-armed state to descend into a tit-for-tat posture against a war-torn neighbour still struggling for international legitimacy? Using economic levers to pressure Kabul may work as a short-term tactic, but it risks long-term strategic costs for Pakistan itself. The Afghan regime may explore alternatives such as trade with India —especially after at least four border closures this year alone. But does that justify policies that endanger the survival of millions of impoverished Afghans? Most experts familiar with the subject agree that employing trade, refugees, visas and educational access as coercive instruments is counterproductive and unlikely to force Kabul into meaningful counter-terror cooperation.

What the current standoff requires is compassion, statesmanship, and a careful evaluation of the long-term consequences of punitive action. Terrorism —whether homegrown or cross-border — must indeed be confronted with firmness. There is no debate about its lethal toll on innocent lives. But the current response is simultaneously creating humanitarian and economic crises on both sides of the border.

Reframing the approach would benefit Pakistan’s own farmers, traders, labourers, shopkeepers and transporters. Larger neighbours tend to act with larger hearts —and they also hold larger stakes in regional stability. Hardline tactics have only further hardened attitudes, damaging Pakistan’s strategic depth across its western frontier.

For now, Pakistan finds itself sandwiched between hostile or unreliable borders on both its east and west. Is such a position viable —strategically or economically —at a moment when the country is seeking foreign investment and attempting to portray itself as a stable, business-friendly, conflict-free destination?