The Iranian Islamic Republics nine lives

The images from Tehran and other Iranian cities are undeniably dramatic. Protesters chanting for regime change, security forces firing on demonstrators, thousands reported killed in what’s being described as the largest uprising since 1979.

The Washington think tank circuit is buzzing with revolutionary fervor, and predictably, calls for American intervention are growing louder.

We’ve been here before. In 2009, during the Green Movement, Western analysts confidently predicted the imminent fall of the Islamic Republic. In 2017-18, when economic protests swept the country, we heard the same refrain.

In 2022-23, during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests following Mahsa Amini’s death, regime collapse seemed inevitable to many observers. Yet here we are in 2026, and the Islamic Republic, battered and weakened though it may be, still stands.

This is not to diminish the genuine grievances driving Iranians into the streets. The rial has lost over 40% of its value since June 2025, following Israel’s devastating strikes on Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure.

The government increased security spending by nearly 150% while offering wage increases amounting to only two-fifths of the inflation rate. The economic pain is real, the political repression brutal, and the popular anger justified.

But regime vulnerability is not the same as regime collapse.

The Islamic Republic has proven remarkably resilient precisely because it was built to survive internal challenges. It possesses a sophisticated architecture of repression: the Revolutionary Guards, the Basij militia, an extensive intelligence apparatus and a willingness to use overwhelming force.

Reports indicate security forces have even attacked hospitals to finish off wounded protesters — a level of brutality that demonstrates the regime’s determination to survive at any cost.

More importantly, the opposition remains fragmented. While roughly one-third of Iranians are strong supporters of exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, another third strongly oppose him, with his support particularly weak among ethnic minorities.

The protests may unite Iranians in what they oppose, but there’s far less consensus on what should replace the current system. In 2024, 43% of Iranians agreed with having “a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections” — hardly a recipe for liberal democracy.

The geopolitical context adds further complexity. US President Donald Trump’s threats of intervention may embolden protesters, but they also allow the regime to rally nationalist sentiment against foreign interference.

History teaches us that external pressure can sometimes strengthen authoritarian regimes by allowing them to frame domestic opposition as foreign-orchestrated conspiracies.

This doesn’t mean the regime emerges unscathed. Israel has systematically dismantled Iran’s regional proxy network, destroying Hamas capabilities in Gaza, degrading Hezbollah in Lebanon and watching Syria’s Assad regime collapse.

Iran’s deterrence has been shattered, its nuclear program set back and its economy is in free fall. The regime is weaker than at any point since its founding.

But “weaker” is not “doomed.” What we’re likely witnessing is not revolutionary transformation but the beginning of a long, grinding process of regime decay. The Islamic Republic may limp forward for years, increasingly hollow and delegitimized but still capable of maintaining power through coercion.

We’ve seen this pattern elsewhere – think of how long it took for the Soviet system to finally collapse after decades of evident dysfunction.

The question isn’t whether Iran will eventually change – it will. The question is whether that change comes through revolutionary upheaval or gradual evolution, and what emerges from either process.

Given Iran’s ethnic diversity, sectarian tensions and lack of democratic traditions, the alternatives to clerical rule may not automatically be preferable from the perspective of regional stability or human rights.

Western policymakers would do well to temper their revolutionary enthusiasm with historical realism. Iran’s opposition deserves our moral support, but not our illusions. The regime may indeed be doomed in the long run, but as Keynes observed, in the long run we’re all dead.

For now, the Islamic Republic has shown once again that it has more lives than a cat – and predictions of its ninth and final death remain, as they have for decades, premature.

This articlewas originally published on Leon Hadar’s Global Zeitgeist and is republished with kind permission. Become a subscriberhere.